## AMERICAN OPINION

In this number

# MAY GOD FORGIVE US

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### May God Forgive Us

December 26, 1919

Dear Reader:

Again we convert the January issue of American Opinion into a special number to fit a special need.

Except for some damaged copies returned by a wholesale agency, there has been no paperbound edition of May God Forgive Us available for several years. During that time there has been a steady dribble of demand. Over the past year this demand has markedly increased.

So we have arranged with the original publishers to let us reprint the thin volume in this format. The index has been omitted, as out of place in a pamphlet; the reading list, because there are so many better ones now available; and the foreword, because it is no longer appropriate. But otherwise the book is complete, with dedication and notes from the first edition. And the only thing added is the apology of your editor, herewith, for once more filling the pages of this magazine with one of his own efforts. May the immodesty seem justified by the purpose.

It should be noted that the main part of May God Forgive Us was written in the summer of 1951, and the smaller second part in February, 1952. The fact that eight years have elapsed since then may give added significance to its message and added convincingness to its warning. For exactly the same formula there described, of Communist conquest by deception, confusion, treason, and terror—as then already successfully applied to China, Poland, Yugoslavia, and other countries — has been used steadily since then without either interruption or substantive change. As of this writing Cuba is the last clear victim to succumb, and there are a dozen other nations now hanging dangerously on the edge of the precipice.

Including our own.

Sincerely,

Robert Welch.

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## May God Forgive Us

ROBERT H. W. WELCH, Jr.

A famous letter giving the historical background of the dismissal of GENERAL MACARTHUR



HENRY REGNERY COMPANY

Chicago . 1952

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#### DEDICATION

"To fear not sensible failure Nor covet the game at all, But fighting, fighting, fighting, Die, driven against the wall."

THE QUARTER of a million brave patriots of Bor-Komorowski's army, mercilessly betrayed by Stalin, died literally driven against the physical walls of their crumbling city of Warsaw. But there are still harder forms of death, in the fight for the very cause rather than the personal enjoyment of freedom, against less material walls.

Behind the Iron Curtain today there are still men and women who, with little hope that they will ever recover freedom for themselves, are daily risking torture and death in their unceasing secret fight against the enveloping darkness of Communism. Without the sustaining excitement of battle, these men and women are willing to buy with their suffering and their lives a tiny breach in the blanket of tyranny. It is these men and women who, as individuals, are willing even to die, driven against the wall of collectivist suppression, for their very beliefs in the dignity and worth and rights of individual man, that this small book is humbly dedicated.

"... the most comprehensive and objective treatment of the complex situation in the Far East that I have yet read."

Albert C. Wedemeyer (in 1952)

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### May God Forgive Us

July 4, 1951

Dear Mr. -:

Your letter of May 8 was read with careful interest. The delay in this reply was made necessary by a short business trip to South America, two candy conventions and some other business meetings in Chicago, and the pressure of my regular work. For it was clear that only a long letter on my part would serve the need, and not until this holiday have I been able even to begin one.

At first glance it seems strange that two men, of obvious good will and of strong patriotic purpose, should read the signs of the times so differently. The best that I can do, in support of my interpretation of motives and events, is to set forth the facts which lead me to the convictions, expressed in my Portland speech, to which you refer. I am sorry that I cannot do this in a few brief paragraphs. For I have to go far afield, and build up these facts step by step, in order to show the ultimate impact and significance of the partly completed pattern as it now appears to me.

In reality I have to begin ten thousand miles away, and twenty-five years ago. The title of my speech before the New England Council of Young Republicans was Acheson and MacArthur. Some of the material I drew upon in that talk has since been batted around, quite ineffectually, in the Senatorial investigation. Much of it has not; for as members of the House have charged, none of the Senators on the investigating committee either knew, or took the trouble to find out, the right questions to ask. But more important

than this failure of the Senators concerned, to steep themselves in the background of the situation they were investigating, has been the failure of anybody with authoritative knowledge to put together the events leading up to that situation in one connected and coherent story. I do not claim to have any such authoritative knowledge, but I shall use such ability as I can muster to integrate into one readable sequence some of the piecemeal history presented by those who do.

It is a disturbing story. Making all due allowance for my lack of skill in assembling these facts, I still do not think you will sleep as well tonight after reading even this amateurish exposition. And it is a terribly important story. I hope that your own serious interest in our whole foreign policy will fortify your patience, to bear with me line by line while I present it as well as I can.

#### II

THE BACKGROUND IN CHINA

Although Lenin himself believed that China would be the first of the world's great nations, outside of Russia, to be taken over by the Communists in their march to world rule, and the United States of America the last, and although the Communists first began work in China in 1920, it was not until 1926-27 that the results of their efforts became noticeable. By that time Earl Browder, Michael Borodin, and several other Communists had infiltrated into the

Kuomingtang as advisers and protégés of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, or of Madame Sun Yat-sen after her husband's death. Earl Browder is well if unfavorably known to American readers. Borodin will be remembered by some as an ex-jewel smuggler and early agent of the Communist International in this country, and by others as the highly important Moscow functionary of twenty years later, who was liaison official between the Soviet Foreign Office and American

newspapermen. Unfortunately for their purposes, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had died in 1925, too early for them to be ready to seize the opportunity thus offered. And although Borodin in particular had played up to General Chiang Kai-shek, the first thing the General did, after consolidating his position as Sun Yat-sen's successor to top power in the Kuomingtang, was to turn against this group of borers from within. So the Communists, with the help of Madame Sun Yat-sen, and while Chiang was on the famous "Northern" campaign in 1927, seized the mechanisms of power at the capital city of Hankow and attempted to constitute themselves a central government. Chiang turned back and drove the whole crowd, by force of arms, in a complete rout out of Hankow. Browder came back to America,1 and Borodin fled to Russia to edit the Moscow News.

This first Communist attempt on China was completely demolished, but some of its reverberations last until today. For Chiang Kai-shek thus became one of the two men, Franco being the other, who has ever beaten the Communists at their own game. There thus began, for reasons that are obvious, the longest and most vicious smear campaign in all history. It is a smear cam-

paign which has colored, for the outside world, a great deal of what Chiang has done or tried to do ever since. And there thus began at the same time that unholy alliance between Madame Sun Yat-sen and the Russian Communists which has been so harmful to China. Living in Moscow, acting as the "goddess" of Sun Yat-sen University in that city, for the training of Chinese students in Communist tactics and guerilla warfare, and appearing publicly with Stalin to welcome Chinese delegations, she has been a traitor to China in fact if not by intention for more than twenty years.

ty years. The second Communist attempt on China, the one which has persisted ever since, was started in 1929 by Joseph Stalin, who had already come to almost supreme power in Russia. It has been conducted from the very first with that combination of cunning, ruthlessness, patience, and twisting with times and events, that is so typical of this dictator. Stalin began by picking a young Chinese intellectual named Mao Tse-tung as his agent; by having this agent undergo a metamorphosis of outward characteristics; and, leaving the cities alone, by planting Mao and his handful of helpers in a rural province of China to promote Communism under the guise of "agrarian reform." It is worth noting here that Mao, trained in Moscow, guided by Moscow, supported at every turn by Moscow, has never been anything but a murderous tool of Stalin. as was well known by most of the traitors and their gullible dupes who promoted the "agrarian reform" myth for American public opinion.

It is worth noting, too, that "agrarian reform" at its very best, as practised by the Communists, means taking all land

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away from its former owners, then hauling those owners into "peoples" courts" on trumped up charges, and sentencing them "leniently" to having both hands chopped off. Some recent articles in the Saturday Evening Post by a physician who had worked behind the Chinese Communist lines were quite factual and revealing. At its worst, "agrarian reform" means to Stalin the deliberate and literal starvation of some three million Ukrainian peasant farmers, and then boasting to Winston Churchill about it fifteen years later, as the only way it was feasible to collectivize the farms into plots big enough for tractors to be used.

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The "agrarian reformers" under Mao, in 1929, proceeded from the very first according to blueprint by forming a Chinese Red Army. Mao's right hand man was "General" Chu Teh; his next in civilian command was Chou En-lai. These are the same two men who, next to Mao, are in top command of the Communist armies fighting our boys in Korea today. But down in Kiangsi province in the early 1930's they were not doing so well, and in 1933 Chiang was able to drive them out. Under Chu Teh's generalship Mao's small forces executed the famous "long march" of about a thousand miles,3 from Kiangsi all the way to the northwest province of Shensi. There they started the same type of "agrarian reform" afresh. And by 1937 they were still just a handful of Russian stooges, spreading terror in a limited area and trying to get ahead.

Then an entirely new factor changed the Mao-Stalin outlook. Japan felt ready, in the march of its confident imperialism, to proceed with the brazen conquest of China, and began its attack on Shanghai on August 13, 1937. The threat to Russia and to Stalin's own ambitions, from a Japan constantly expanding and growing in military might, was very real. What's more, the inevitable confusion that would be caused in China by the invading Japanese forces was exactly what Stalin knew how to use to best advantage. So he ordered his stooge Mao to form a "united front" with Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese. And on September 22, 1937 the "Communist Party" announced that its former "Red Army" had been reorganized as a part of the Chinese National Army.

Such an official reorganization did theoretically take place, for Chiang was desperate for all the help and all the "Chinese unity," that could possibly be obtained to hold off the Japanese. Most of the Chinese Communist armed forces were constituted as China's 18th Group Army, with about 45,000 men. But it still remained under the command of the same Communist General Chu Teh, as before. A short time later the remaining ten thousand armed Communists were officially designated as China's New Fourth Army, also under the command of a Communist general. For about two years, until it became clear that China was not going to cave in under the Japanese attack, and probably obvious to Stalin that America would presently be in a war with Japan, the Chinese Communist forces did do some fighting against the Japanese, and refrained from too much troublemaking for the Nationalist forces in China. But they never actually merged with the Nationalist armies or submitted to military control by the Nationalist command; and from the first they claimed an autonomy that was inconsistent with any sound military organization, or with

their own pledges at the time Chiang had accepted the "united front."

By the middle of 1939 the situation had become so bad that Chiang told Chou En-lai he would no longer tolerate this pretended autonomy. But by this time the Communists were ready to begin a steady expansion of their occupied area at the expense of civil war in China. And in January, 1940, directly disobeying orders from Generalissimo Chiang, the New Fourth Army moved into zones in Anhwei Province in order to begin establishing Communist corridor from their stronghold in Shensi all the way to the east coast. The government had no other course than to disband the mutinous troops. But instead of telling the world what had happened, and disclosing the conclusive proofs of treason which were found on officers of the captured Fourth Army, the Nationalist Government tried hard to hush the whole thing up. They thought that such evidence of civil strife would be harmful in their relations with other governments. As a consequence the Communists flooded the press of the world with stories about Chiang's unwarranted oppression of his "Communist allies" which were just about as truthful as the usual Communist propaganda.

But this was only the beginning, and far worse was soon to come. From 1940 on Chiang was compelled to immobilize some of his own forces, so badly needed for fighting the Japanese, to keep Mao's Communists from over-running more and more territory. And in 1942, after America had come into the war, Stalin felt that he had nothing ultimately to fear from Japan on the Asiatic frontier. In helping to persuade America to neglect the Pacific and

throw all of its strength into the European struggle, he had two main purposes. One was to save European Russia from Hitler's armies. The other was to keep the war going in China as long as possible, because every day that Japan's defeat there could be delayed was just that much more opportunity for Mao to increase Communist strength in the confusion.

So immediately after Pearl Harbor there was a reaffirmation between Russia and Japan of the Molotov-Matsuoka Pact.4 This was something which the Russophiles were careful to keep under wraps at the time, and which they have been trying — with remarkable success - to have the world forget about ever since. The most important part of this pact was a five-year pledge on the part of both nations to commit no act of aggression against each other. Here we had been attacked by Japan. Instead of fighting back at our attacker we were rushing over to Europe, with all the military pressure we could exert and all the matériel of war we could possibly send, at whatever expense of lives and money, to protect and save Russia in its desperate plight before Hitler's armies. And this Russia we were trying so hard to save not only calmly confirmed its alliance with our enemy Japan, who had attacked us, but used that alliance as a means of crippling more and more our ally China, which was fighting on our side against this enemy Japan and had already been fighting this same enemy for four years. The cold-blooded cynicism of this deal is only less astounding than Stalin's correct assumption that our government would swallow it - so far had the Stalinites already gone, through propaganda and treason, in influencing

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The formal result of this pact was a state of complacent neutrality between Russia and Japan for over three years. Each could proceed about its own nefarious purposes without worrying about being sideswiped by the other. And in actual truth, the only reason this worked out all to the advantage of Russia and to no benefit for Japan was that America happened to be on the side of Russia and against Japan.

The chief practical result was the free hand that Stalin thus gave himself and Mao to begin the real dismemberment of China. Mao resumed the civil war in earnest. His forces began infiltrating and seizing area after area in North China. Despite the Molotov-Matsuoka Pact, Mao could still engage in guerilla tactics against the Japanese, because of the fiction that the Russians had no control over the Chinese Communists - just as Russia maintains the formal fiction that she has nothing to do with the Korean fighting today. And there was great propaganda value for Mao, as well as a means of getting actual and direct American help, in putting up an appearance of fighting the Japanese. But even his rule-of-thumb instructions to his generals to devote thirty percent of their effort to fighting the Japanese and seventy percent to fighting Chiang finally became valid only in appearance. And of course the increasing quantities of Chiang's forces that had to be used to withstand this armed Communist encroachment far more than offset any damage inflicted on the Japanese by Mao.

For by 1945 Mao's army had grown to over a million men.<sup>5</sup> In 1937 these Communists had controlled territory in Shensi, with a total of less than 500,000

inhabitants, or about 1/8 of 1% of the population of China.6 By 1945 they controlled large parts of the populous provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Jehol, Shansi, Shantung, Kiangsu and Anhwei. This they had been enabled to do by Japan's attack on China. During the really effective last four years of this time, this man Mao had been fighting against our active ally Chiang, while we were at war. Yet this is the man that the Communist traitors in our midst and their dupes and allies have persuaded us to befriend in every way, at the expense of our ally Chiang, since 1945 when Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese, worn out and impoverished with eight years of fighting Japanese invaders, had earned and so badly needed our help and friendship instead of the betrayal we have given them.

#### III STEPS OF BETRAYAL

You may be asking how all of this has sufficient bearing on contemporary American foreign policy and on today's national politics to justify the space I have given it. But I hope you will accept my assurance that it does, and that you will be convinced as to the accuracy of this assurance before my letter is finished. For the word "betrayal" was used deliberately and advisedly above. And the next step in this letter, to see how this betrayal was stage-managed, brings us much closer home.

For in 1945, when we and our ally China had won the war with the Japanese—and China was our only really effective ally in that war—it would have seemed utterly inconceivable that Mao's Communists could conquer the country within five years. And certainly it was impossible by force. But it was

accomplished nevertheless, by an almost unbelievable combination of trickery, chicanery, and treason. At every step Mao could have been stopped by our government, and usually by simply carrying out orders of the American Congress and giving Chiang the supplies congress had actually voted him. Instead we deliberately turned over rule of China's four hundred million people to Stalin's stooge. Let's look at some of the steps and forces which brought this about.

1. The first was allowing Russia to seize Manchuria. At Yalta, in January and February of 1945, Alger Hiss helped to arrange to give Stalin Port Arthur, Dairen, the Kurile Islands, and Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek and our Chinese allies were neither present, nor consulted, nor even advised of this monstrous deal. The gift was supposed to be a bribe to get Russia to enter the war. The bribe was put through despite the expressed knowledge of our military commanders that the Japs were collapsing and Russian help was not needed, and despite a specific and urgent message from MacArthur to President Roosevelt pleading against letting Russia come in at all.

For it was obvious then to any honest and informed observer that Russia wanted to enter the war in Japan at the last minute, for the prestige, the booty grabbing, and the place at subsequent council tables which she would claim as one of the victors. The disgraceful folly of the course we had pursued in Europe, in stopping our armies to allow Russia to become the *de facto* conquerer of Berlin and Prague and Vienna, was already perfectly evident to any military man with patriotism and common sense. MacArthur was bitterly opposed

to repeating this idiocy—or treason—with the likeihood of even more disastrous results, in the Far East.

Nevertheless the huge concession of somebody else's territory and peoples was made. Russia then kept the war going as long as she possibly could, even by having Malik conceal for two months the first Japanese attempts at surrender - the same Malik who has been screaming his head off at the United Nations over the past many months. When the Japanese Emperor finally succeeded in reaching American commanders with an offer to surrender, despite this duplicity of what they thought was a friendly "neutral" embassy, Russia declared war on Japan just six days before the surrender became effective.

But the arrangements which had been made under this pretense of buying Russia as our ally were a great deal more far-reaching than the mere handout of certain specified booty. For they practically invited Russia to march in and take over Manchuria. This she proceeded to do—with well over a billion dollars worth of American arms and supplies that had been furnished her Far East armies in 1944 and 1945!

It is worth pausing a minute over that fact. In 1944 and 1945 Russia not only was not our ally in that part of the world, she was the ally of our enemy Japan. There was no military or political justification for our sending to her Far East army one gun or one shell, especially when all of our production of munitions was still so badly needed by both our allies and ourselves. But during that time somebody in our State Department found means and excuses to send these trans-Siberian forces of Stalin, nevertheless, more than twice as much war matériel as we sent to

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Chiang Kai-shek during the whole four years of his desperate fighting as our ally. And whereas all help that we sent to Stalin, and to every one of our European allies, was turned over to their governments outright, that provided for Chiang was dribbled out to him under the most humiliating terms by our agents in China.

But the main point of this section is that, using our arms and supplies, Stalin's army did grab all of Manchuria, loot it of approximately two billion dollars' worth of industrial equipment, and then turn the province over to Mao as a base of operations. It is from their sanctuaries within Manchuria that Mao has flown his Russian-made jets and marched his protected armies, to inflict sixty-five thousand casualties on our American boys and to devastate com-

pletely the whole peninsula of Korea.

2. The second necessary step was for the United States to be persuaded, by the traitors and their dupes and allies within our government, to pull all of our forces out of China, so that Mao could have a free hand. This was easily

accomplished.

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3. The third step was the persuasion of the United States to supply no arms to Chiang. When the war ended in 1945 there were in India huge stockpiles of war matériel which, under pressure of our military leaders that could not be evaded, had got that far on their way to Chiang. These supplies were actually destroyed. Then in March of 1946 General George C. Marshall, perennial "good soldier" of the State Department, clamped a ten-months embargo on even the sale of arms and replacements to Nationalist China, at the very time that Russia was giving Mao all of the immense Japanese army reserves of war matériel that had been stockpiled in Manchuria.

(Incidentally, within the three months immediately preceding the date of this letter, the Communist steamer Ming Shan has taken steel and machinery and a thousand tons of rubber from Hong Kong to Mao's forces. A Danish freighter, the Heinrich Jessen, has taken a shipload of steel into Tientsin. The Soviet ship Vilnus has carried into Asiatic Soviet ports, from Singapore, one load of six thousand tons of rubber. And our naval ships, under orders from our State Department, have been compelled to stand by and allow these supplies to be delivered to our enemies, right under their noses, and while such

supplies were being used daily to enable

Mao's armies to kill our sons and broth-

ers only a few hundred miles away.)

4. As a fourth step the United States was persuaded to take a position of formal neutrality between the recognized, friendly, and established government of China, and the Communist terrorists. In practice the insistence of U.S. representatives, and especially of General George Marshall, that the "rights" and aspirations and claims of the Communists be given equal consideration with those of the Nationalist Government itself had the net effect of immensely helping Mao. And this policy was deliberately persisted in despite overwhelming proof that the Mao Communists sought the disruption rather than the unity of China, and would break every agreement and every article

have seemed at the time. Here are some extracts from General

of faith just as fast as they were agreed

upon, no matter how favorable a con-

cession on the part of the Chiang gov-

ernment, to the Communists, they may

Marshall's own report, of January 7, 1947, on his mission to China:

"The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved."

"However, a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies, and purposes of our Government this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans."....

"Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three Marines and the wounding of twelve others were almost pure fabrication,..."

"Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible to get them to sit down at a conference table with government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer, which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13, which the Government could not be ex-

pected to accept." . . . .

"The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by an extensive guerilla action against the long lines of rail communications—regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people."... th

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"The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

"In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted."

Necessarily, I have taken some of these quotations out of context. The statement also contains criticisms of the Kuomingtang, of course. In discussing the Communists' "wholesale disregard of facts" Marshall adds: "In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda."

But his chief complaint against the Kuomingtang was that "reactionaries" among them refused to believe that the Communists had any real intention other than the destruction and conquest of China, or to take any of the promises or agreements of the Communists in good faith, or to believe that honest cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the Government was conceivable. Nevertheless, in accordance with his instructions from President Truman and Dean Acheson, Marshall kept insisting rigidly on such cooperation, and acceptance of the Communists into the Government, as a prerequisite to help from our government, or even decent treatment on the part of our government, in the economic situation being made constantly more desperate by the tactics of those very Communists.

The net result of this "neutrality" meddling, on the part of a supposed friend holding out promises of great help so badly needed, was disastrous. For it is clear now that in the period from December, 1945 to December, 1946, China still had sufficient remaining strength, and Chiang's armies were still strong enough in comparison with those of Mao - after all, Chiang's armies had held at bay nearly three million 7 Japanese in China, most of whom would otherwise have been fighting us - to have crushed the Communists entirely. The demand of the Communists in December, 1946, that military positions be restored to those of the preceding January, is unwitting evidence quoted by Marshall himself as to what had happened militarily during the year despite everything. But it was exactly during this period of December, 1945, to December, 1946, that General Marshall forced on Chiang Kai-shek three separate truces with the Communists, giving them a chance each time to stave off defeat and regroup their forces. In the

light of these developments it is pathetic to hear Marshall complaining in January, 1947 — in this same report — about "the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February."

There was sad irony in this situation for Chiang, as well as frustration and the makings of despair. He knew that every suggestion of peaceful unity on the part of the Communists was merely pretense, that their every apparent concession to civilized procedures was merely an act of going through motions, and that any compromise arrangement, no matter how solemnly agreed to, was to them only a stepping stone from which to move on again as soon as expedient; and that they had no real interest whatsoever in any "solution" except their ultimate conquest of all China. He had known Mao and his chief lieutenants, their tactics and purposes, well, and he had been fighting them, for twenty years. He had put them down successfully and repeatedly until the long and crushing Japanese invasion and then the weight of Russia's assistance had given Mao his chance. But here he was being told, month after month and actually year after year, by representatives of the one great ally on whom he should have been able to depend for help, that anybody in his own government who could not believe the Chinese Communists to be "agrarian reformers," and idealists at heart, was a reactionary who had to be tossed out of his government; and that this government had to be "broadened" by taking the Communists in. Since the Communists themselves made sure that the latter demand could never be fulfilled. the result reached all the way to an embargo on our sale of arms to Chiang

with which to fight these Communists. And in President Truman's own published statement of December 18, 1946, in which he reports that in August China had purchased—not been given—all of our surplus property that was rotting in the Pacific areas ("rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions" was the phrase used), he boasted that aircraft and non-demilitarized combat material had been excluded; and that "thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement."

Until December, 1941, Japan had conducted its four-years' invasion of China under specious terminologies that avoided a formal declaration of war. Immediately after Japan attacked us at Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek's Government declared war on Japan, on Germany, and on Italy. His simple message to President Roosevelt read as follows: "To our new common battle we offer all we are and all we have, to stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy."

Not all of the twenty-five years of vicious smearing by the Communists and their sympathizers, nor the halfbaked criticisms of his government by those who know nothing of China's problems, have ever been able to make of Chiang Kai-shek personally anything but a Christian gentleman. He lived up to that pledge with the "all he had," and undoubtedly saved tens of thousands of American lives by doing so. Never has an ally deserved better of a companion nation in arms. Never has one been let down, instead, more completely, more ignobly, nor with more of that very perfidy which was to have been abolished by the fight.

5. A fifth important step, so necessary to the purposes of the Communist sympathizers, was the suppression of the Wedemeyer report. The report was dated September 19, 1947. That General Marshall wrote a letter to President Truman concerning the report, in which he said "I think this should be suppressed," and that President Truman wrote in his own hand on the margin of this letter "I agree—H.T.", and that the report was completely suppressed until far too late for it to do Chiang any good, is all well-known history now.

The accurate presentation in that report of Soviet aims and purposes was more than sympathizers with those purposes, or their dupes and allies, could allow to appear. And just one of Wedemeyer's major suggestions, that Manchuria be put under a United Nations trusteeship, could certainly have prevented the Korean war and sixty-five thousand American casualties. For his honesty and unshakable patriotism Wedemeyer was taken out of circulation by assignment to a minor post, and has since been led by the futility of his position to resign from the army our youngest and probably ablest Lieutenant General, sacrificed to the pro-Soviet pressure group, and as a warning to anybody else, in government or out, who dares stand up and throw facts in their face.

6. The sixth of the important and necessary chronological steps was, when the tide had completely turned and all China was falling to the Communists too obviously for denial, to persuade the United States still to take no stand and no step which would prevent the catastrophe. Even Mao must have been unable to believe his good luck. Time

after time, by a firm United States stand, Mao would have been stopped in his tracks and afraid to go further. Instead of taking such a stand, our government rebuffed Chiang at every turn and every appeal. And until recent developments made such a position politically untenable, at least temporarily, this policy of throwing Chiang overboard was to have been continued until even Formosa was in Communist hands. But that is getting a little ahead of my story.

#### IV Hiss and Company

For it is time now to start looking at the American section of this picture. In the pages above I have spoken of this or that end having been accomplished by the traitors and their dupes and allies in our government. It is time to show how these traitors and their dupes and allies have accomplished such ends; by infiltrating and controlling organizations already extant; by setting up numberless deceptive new ones; and by achieving an amazing domination of our State Department, both as individuals and through these organizations.

There is no chance to look at all, or even at an appreciable fraction, of these fronts, organizations, and developments. We shall have to pick as samples just a few of those which are both important and pertinent to our present topic of discussion.

1. The most important of all organizations within that category, without doubt, is the famous Institute of Pacific Relations. It was founded, and financed by American philanthropy of the "Carnegie" type, as a supposedly unbiased fact-finding and educational agency to promote international peace, under-

standing, and friendly relations in the Pacific area of the world. It had acquired great prestige, and become a terrifically important medium for influencing public opinion. And during the 1930's this organization was gradually infiltrated and practically taken over by the Communists, their dupes and their allies.

Administration of the IPR was in the hands of an Executive Committee of eight, plus a Chairman and a Secretary, chosen from and by the trustees. Among the trustees, during the 1940's, were Henry Wallace, Alger Hiss, F. Mortimer Graves, Len DeCaux, Donald G. Tewkesbury, Lauchlin Currie, and Maxwell S. Stewart.

Wallace you know about. Also Alger Hiss. F. Mortimer Graves had been Chairman of the Washington Committee for Aid to China, officially cited by government agencies as a Communist Front. Graves promoted a Paul Robeson concert in Washington in 1941, and a check-up revealed that the proceeds of that concert had gone to a Communist party organization. (Remember Graves was the *promoter* of the affair,)

Lauchlin Currie was later named by Elizabeth Bentley as one of her top Washington contacts, when she was a Russian spy, in securing information to send to Russia. Currie was also named as a Communist fellow-worker by Whittaker Chambers.

Maxwell Stewart was a former teacher at the Moscow Institute, and his name has appeared on fifty-two different organizations cited by government agencies as subversive.

These were among the trustees. Four of the actual members of the Executive Committee of ten were Edward C.

Carter, Secretary General, Owen Lattimore, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and Harriet Lucy Moore. We'll take time for only some sample indications of where their loyalties or sympathies lay.

Edward C. Carter had received from Stalin himself the *Order of the Red Banner of Labor*. In 1938 he had signed a statement defending the notorious and infamous Moscow purge trials.

Owen Lattimore had also been on the editorial board of Amerasia, of which more presently. He resigned from the board in 1941, and gives the noblest reasons for having joined in the first place. As early as 1937 Mr. Lattimore, along with Philip J. Jaffe and T. A. Bisson, paid a visit to the Chinese Communists at Yenan. There is a picture extant of these three posing in Yenan and a letter extant from Agnes Smedley telling Jaffe how grateful she and her fellow Communists were "to all of you. There has never been anything like this here before." Though Mr. Lattimore claims to have had "no connection with Amerasia after 1941," he admits that on the Sunday three days prior to the arrests in that case, both Andrew Roth and John Service were at his house, getting his advice on the galley proofs of Roth's forthcoming book. Service and Roth were among the six Amerasia leaders arrested by the F.B.I. three days later. Mr. Lattimore fails to mention some matters concerning two such good friends, which and who will turn up later in this letter. But Mr. Lattimore, for most excellent reasons in connection with his writings, goes out of his way to condemn "guilt by omission." Mr. Lattimore is a very smart man. I defy anybody, unless extremely well-informed as to background, to read just twenty pages of any of his books

and not decide that here is an honest idealist; misguided or prejudiced, perhaps, but an honest idealist nevertheless. But I also defy anybody, who does have any knowledge of the background whatsoever, to read all of Solution In Asia and Ordeal By Slander, and not come out with the same conviction as my own. Here is the slickest, trickiest, cleverest intellectual eel I have run across in forty years of voracious reading.

Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a columnist for *The Daily Worker*, has long been known as "the millionaire Communist." During this past year he has refused to tell a Congressional Committee whether or not he was a Communist, on the grounds that it might incriminate him.

Harriet Lucy Moore was a contributor to *Amerasia*, and tied in with many other Communist enterprises.<sup>8</sup>

Typical of the publicity methods employed by the IPR under this kind of control was an article published in 1943 in Far Eastern Survey, the Institute's official publication. This article, supposed to be an objective analysis of the China situation, was really a poisonous attack on the Chinese Nationalist Government and a eulogy of the Chinese Communists.

"There are two Chinas," it said. "One is now generally called Kuomingtang China; the other is called Communist China. However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive the one might be called feudal China, the other democratic China."

Please remember that this was in 1943, when the Chinese Nationalist Government was holding back three million Japanese on Chinese soil. (In case you doubt this number, it is from

the official figure of our government in connection with the Japanese armed forces, administrators, technicians, and so forth, that had to be repatriated from China to Japan after V-J day. From President Truman's statement of December 18, 1946, for instance: "There were about 3,000,000 Japanese, nearly one-half of them Army or Navy personnel, to be evacuated." The number officially given in the same report as actually evacuated by November, 1946, was 2,986,438.) The Chinese Communists at that time were a still small but noisy and troublesome bunch of terrorists in the northwest provinces, only making any headway at all because of their ability to take advantage of the load which Chiang and the government of China were carrying as our allies in the fight against Japan.

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The whole article was a composite of plain vicious lies, by one T. A. Bisson. Bisson was part of a Communist front called "Friends of the Chinese People," which has been listed by the Attorney General of the U.S. as subversive. Bisson had been a speaker, along with Earl Browder and Philip Jaffe, at dinners given by these "Friends" in 1934 and 1935. He was later a member of the editorial board of Amerasia. He was one of the notorious four hundred who followed every turn of the Stalinist line so closely as to have endorsed the Hitler-Stalin pact that set off World War II.

This was the kind of "impartial" authority given wide publication by the Institute of Pacific Relations. But the IPR had much more direct and important influence in other ways. As Benjamin Gitlow says, through the IPR the Communists bored their way into our State Department. It had amazing suc-

cess in placing its chosen agents in high positions in American agencies dealing with China. It was a virtual employment agency, managed by Carter and Graves, for pro-communist personnel.

In the notes for my speech that started all of this I have ten illustrations of such Communists or Communist sympathizers who were placed in positions of great importance in our State Department by the IPR. But it requires too much space to document the Communist sympathies of even this fraction of the total number placed, for one thing. And for another, because there is always the chance of doing some individual an injustice through a mistaken interpretation of his actions, I have no desire to name names except where they seem essential to the thread and the convincingness of the story. There already are and will have to be too many actual names in this letter for me to be happy about the necessity for such identifications. But whereas a mistake is always possible with regard to some one individual here and there, there is no such possibility of a mistaken interpretation of the sympathies, purposes, and results achieved by such groups as a whole as that which has long controlled the Institute of Pacific Relations.

2. Since we have mentioned Amerasia so often, let's look next at that publication and the group behind it. Early in 1945, the F.B.I. learned that somebody in the State Department was feeding this magazine confidential reports and papers. After several months of careful investigation, on June 6, 1945 the F.B.I. arrested Kate L. Mitchell, Editor; Philip J. Jaffe, Co-Editor; Mark J. Gayn, contributor; John S. Service, State Department Foreign Service Of-

ficer; Emmanuel S. Larsen, State Department Research Expert on China Affairs; and Andrew Roth, Liaison Officer between Naval Intelligence and the State Department. In the Amerasia offices in New York were found more than one hundred files of top-secret documents stoien from the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, Office of Strategic Services, and Office of War Information. Among these papers was a detailed report showing the disposition of every unit in

Chiang Kai-shek's army!

Immediately, some very high mysterious influence went to work to hush up the case. The Department of Justice representatives presented it to the Grand Jury in such a way that only Jaffe, Larsen, and Roth were indicted. Since you will be hearing more about John S. Service, it is particularly worth noting that Acheson's influence was definitely exerted on his behalf, and his case was dropped; despite the fact that the F.B.I. showed, amoug other things, that a Russian agent, Max Granich, had acted as go-between for Jaffe and Service. (And despite the fact that Service had just recently been fired by Pat Hurley from our embassy in Chungking, and sent back to America because of his pro-Communist activities.) Mark J. Gayn was cleared despite the fact that two hundred secret documents were found in his apartment. Later the case against Roth was nol-prossed. Jaffe was allowed to plead guilty, and fined \$2,500.00. Larsen was fined \$500.00. That was all. Neither heaven nor earth has been able to open the case since, despite several congressional attempts. This was treason, nothing else; plain unqualified, indefensible treason. But the perpetrators could not be reached. The traitors, their

dupes, and allies were already too strongly entrenched.

3. For a sample of some of the activities of the traitors, their dupes, and allies, working as individuals instead of through organizational fronts, one good place to take a look is at the American Embassy in Chungking under Major General Patrick Hurley. He was appointed a special envoy to China on August 18, 1944, and given the full rank of Ambassador on November 30. He remained in China until September, 1945.10

The fact that Hurley succeeded Henry Wallace and preceded George Marshall in their missions to China is a pretty good indication of the outlook the State Department assumed him to have when they gave him the job. He was definitely thought in many quarters to be pro-Mao, and there is little doubt as to his having swallowed enough pro-Mao propaganda to be biased in that direction. He was sent to persuade Chiang to take the Communists into a coalition government, and he set out to accomplish that purpose.

But Hurley had a mind of his own, and was honest. In time he was completely disillusioned. When he began really to open his eyes he was amazed. He found that the embassy was loaded with Communist sympathizers and active pro-Communist workers. He found, among other things, that some of these officials were not only sending secret reports to Washington, contradicting his recommendations, but that copies of these reports were also going directly to the Chinese Communists. Finally Hurley fired summarily, and sent home from Chungking, eleven American embassy officials who were, in his opinion, too pro-Communist to be of any use in China. Hurley himself returned to Washington, to have a showdown. He had one, got what he thought were reasonable instructions, and then — I know this sounds like something out of an Oppenheim novel, but it is historical fact, nevertheless—was double-crossed by having those instructions actually changed in the course of the stenographic copying during the night. He immediately resigned, with a blast which included the following:

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"The professional foreign service men sided with the Communist armed party and the imperialistic bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Communists were given control." Hurley demanded an investigation, but mysterious influences again prevented it. The Communist traitors, their dupes and allies were too strongly entrenched, especially in the State Department.

Now, as the most important part of this whole episode, consider this. Among the eleven men fired by Hurley and sent home from Chungking, as too pro-Communist to be any good, were these:

George Atcheson, Jr.
John P. Davies, Jr.
Fulton Freeman
Hungerford B. Howard
Raymond P. Ludden
Edward E. Rice
Arthur Ringwalt

John S. Service

And every single one of these men was then actually promoted by our State Department.

John P. Davies became a member, representing the Far East, in the Top Planning Board, which drafts overall State Department policy. Ringwalt was appointed Chief of the China Division of the State Department. Rice and Freeman became Assistant Chiefs of the China Division. Both Ludden and Howard were sent back to China in the American consular service. And John S. Service and George Atcheson were actually sent to Japan to advise MacArthur.

MacArthur flatly refused to have Service, so he was brought back home and — after Dean Acheson succeeded George Marshall as Secretary of State—was put in charge of placements and promotions in the Department. This man who had been arrested by the F.B.I. for treasonous activities, a man with a long record of pro-Communist sympathies and actions, was put by Acheson in position to determine who should do what work, and who promoted and who not, in the State Department.

4. Let's look at just a very few more illustrations along these lines, before proceeding at long last to the body and main theme of this letter.

From 1937 to 1943 the Chief of the Far Eastern Office in our State Department was one Maxwell M. Hamilton, a friend of Alger Hiss, and who was named along with Hiss on that list of eleven hundred Communist fellow-travelers on the Federal payroll cited in 1941 by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

In 1944 John Carter Vincent became

Director of China Affairs, and in 1945 Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. He threw the weight of his office in every way he could in favor of Mao and against Chiang. One illustration of his outlook towards the whole Asiatic picture will have to suffice. General MacArthur, at a critical point in his effort to keep Russia out of a vetoing role in Japan, issued a warning against the threat of Communism in the islands. In September, 1946, Vincent rushed into print to rebuke Mac-Arthur, and to state that MacArthur was violating State Department directives for Japan. These directives, Vincent said, sought to use Japan for "building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union."

A whole year before that, or in September, 1945, our Embassy in Moscow had already warned our State Department against putting any confidence in Russia observing either the spirit or the letter of any of its treaties and agreements in the Far East. The Soviet policy since then, especially in support of the Chinese Communists, in direct violation of the treaty it had signed with Nationalist China on August 14, 1945, and in all of its other actions, had clearly shown its intention to spread terror and confusion over all of Eastern Asia as rapidly as it could. Yet here was our Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs willing to toss Japan to the Communists as a means of "building a bridge of friendship with the Soviet Union." Fortunately here was just one more place, and an early one, where MacArthur paid as little attention as he could to either the idiotic or the treasonous directions that he received from Washington.

It is very hard to pin any specific

overt Communist connection on Vincent, except by the overwhelming evidence of association. But there has been unearthed one warning, made in 1945 by an official of the Office of Strategic Services, that because of Vincent's association with incidents and individuals involved in leaks of information through the Soviet Embassy Moscow, no secret information should be divulged that might reach Vincent. He may have been completely innocent of anything but prejudice and stupidity. If so, the help his stupidity gave to the Mao Communists didn't hurt him any, for he was promoted in 1947 to become United States Minister to Switzerland, and remained in that position for about three years. More recently he has been demoted to a consular job in Tangiers, whether because too much heat was finally being turned on for the State Department to keep him so conspicuously exposed, or for some other purpose, I have no idea.

Through all these years and activities two notorious names pop up everywhere. One is that of Owen Lattimore. I have already commented on him just a little and will add only one more incident in this connection. When we had withdrawn our troops from Korea and invitingly abandoned it to possible attack, the question could not be quite ignored, on the surface anyway, as to what should be done if it were attacked. Mr. Acheson turned to Owen Lattimore for advice on this point. And in a secret memorandum to the State Department Lattimore proposed that Korea should be allowed "to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed it." I wonder how the mothers of American boys who have been killed in Korea like that as a policy of the American government.

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The other name was that of Alger Hiss. Not only was Hiss with the dying Roosevelt at Yalta, whispering advice in his ear, but he was one of four State Department "experts" who had been sent ahead to prepare the notes and directives for the conference. He had become Assistant to the Director of Far Eastern Affairs as early as 1938. He climbed steadily in influence over Far Eastern Affairs, and many of the documents stolen by Hiss which were finally presented by Whittaker Chambers were confidential papers of the Far Eastern Office. At Yalta he was able to give an open road to Manchuria to Russia, and to lay the groundwork for giving it all of China.

On one of the earlier occasions when the loyalty of Alger and Donald Hiss had been questioned, it was Acheson who had stated that he would vouch for both absolutely, and who had thus shut off the investigation. Even after Hiss was convicted Acheson stated publicly that he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss — he certainly hasn't turned his back on Alger Hiss's policies — and Donald Hiss is still in Acheson's law

firm today.

Now there are dozens and dozens more of individuals like those I have mentioned, who have made and carried out our disastrous policies with regard to the Chinese Communists. Almost without exception they have been friends of Acheson, used by him, supported by him, and kept in the State Department by him. And this background is absolutely necessary to a real understanding of the events of the past few weeks. So let's now look at Dean Acheson himself; and largely—but not exclusively — at his acts and policies

which have a bearing on MacArthur's role.

#### V Dean Acheson

A little of some other history is again needed for background. It is to be noted first that Dean Acheson's sympathy for Communist ambitions has not been restricted to those ambitions in the Far East. When still Undersecretary of State, Mr. Acheson forced through a loan of ninety million dollars to the Soviet-controlled Warsaw government of Poland. The loan had been negotiated by Donald Hiss, Alger Hiss's brother, a member of Acheson's law firm. Our Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, pointing out the Red terror in Poland, the arrests of American citizens and the crushing of all freedoms, appealed to the State Department to refuse the loan. He said: "With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable, I beg the department not to approve the extension of any credits at this time." The loan was approved, nevertheless, and the money was used to strengthen Soviet control of Poland. It was probably this experience which, when a year or two later Acheson was made Secretary of State, prompted Lane to blurt out: "God help the United States!"

In November, 1945, there was a Madison Square Garden rally called by the National Conference of Soviet American Friendship. Its excuse was the welcoming of that extremely pro-Soviet screwball, the red Dean of Canterbury. The speakers included Corliss Lamont, Paul Robeson, and Dean Acheson. Mr. Acheson told the assembled audience of Communists and fellow travelers that there was no specific reason to suppose that the vital interests of the American

and Russian people would ever clash. "We understand," he said, "and agree with them to have friendly governments along her borders is essential, both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world."

This meant clearly that, so far as Acheson could control the situation, the United States would not oppose Stalin's setting up "friendly governments," which is of course a euphemism for satellite governments, along the Soviet borders. And the State Department under Acheson's domination has acquiesced in the establishment of such

satellites in Europe.

It is no wonder that Acheson was early praised by the Daily Worker, official organ of the Communist Party, "as one of the most forward looking men in the State Department." And it is interesting to note that in March. 1946, a few months after this Madison Square Garden rally, when Winston Churchill made his speech in Fulton, Missouri, warning the world against real Soviet purposes, and the speech was so bitterly assailed by Moscow and by Communists everywhere, Mr. Acheson snubbed Churchill by refusing to appear at the New York dinner in his honor.

Another item worth including in this brief list is the report on atomic energy, dated March, 1946, which was prepared by Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal together. It proposed giving the secrets of atomic energy, including the bomb, to Russia outright. It stated "there can be no international cooperation which does not presuppose international community of knowledge." Fortunately, there were some wiser heads which did prevail against this extreme folly. Russia was offered the atomic secrets subject to a continuing inspection, free of

the veto, in all countries of their use: and this Russia refused. As we know now, she was getting the atomic secrets

by treason anyway.

Then all-important has been Mr. Acheson's coddling and support of subversives in his department. The record is almost unbelievable. Despite continuous warnings from the F.B.I. and from security officers within the State Department itself — at least one of whom was threatened for being overzealous — the infiltration of doubtful characters into the State Department had gone so far by June, 1947, that a Senate appropriations subcommittee addressed a then secret memorandum to George Marshall, then Secretary of State. This memorandum read in part as follows:

"It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson. It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity.

"On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the F.B.I. on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves a large number of State Department employees, some in high official positions. .... Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the connection of the State Department employees and officials with this Soviet espionage ring."

Please note that this memorandum was not written by irresponsible rabblerousers. It was not written by some one Senator, who might be accused of seek-

ing notoriety and votes. It was not written for public consumption at all. It was a dignified, official, intra-government memorandum, prepared in carefully weighed language by a group of United States Senators who were in a position to know what was going on. Keeping that in mind, will you please reread this sentence: "It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity." But George Marshall did nothing about this report, of course, and no change in the State Department policy referred to has ever become evident. The traitors, their dupes and allies, were too solidly in control.

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We could go on with details along these lines almost indefinitely. It was Acheson who went to bat for John Service when he was arrested in the Amerasia case. Despite the fact that Service has since admitted turning over secret documents to Philip Jaffe, a known Soviet agent, he has been consistently promoted by Acheson. It was Acheson who prevented the House Un-American Activities Committee from holding public hearings in the case of Sam Carp, a Bridgeport, Connecticut businessman whose sister is Molotov's wife, and whose business relations with the Soviet Union needed some explaining. It was Acheson who rushed to the defense of Lauchlin Currie, who was named as a fellow traveler by both Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. And Currie still stands high in the graces of the State Department today.

It was Acheson who, as late as the middle of 1947, over bitter congressional

opposition, insisted on still sending seventeen million dollars worth of postwar lendlease supplies direct to Russia. It seems that, according to Mr. Acheson, there was some unfinished commitment which made it our moral obligation to do so. But the fact that the Russians were still holding and using over six hundred of our ships, and refusing to return them despite the firmest kind of commitment to do so — this apparently involved no moral lapse whatsoever, in the mind of Mr. Acheson. At any rate today, four years later, the Russians still have 670 of the 672 ships, and are still refusing to return another one.

It was Acheson who permitted Valentin Gubitchev, a convicted Russian spy in this country, to depart peacefully for his homeland, while plenty of Americans were and still are being held in Soviet prisons on phony charges — one being Robert Vogeler, who was held fifteen months and then turned loose as a physical wreck after our government had met the blackmail demands put forth as a condition for his release.

The record is enormous. So let's call it off here, and get nearer to the crux of our discussion, which is Acheson's acts and policies as they have directly affected MacArthur's part of the world.

#### VI ACHESON AND MACARTHUR

It is to be noted that Acheson has had to overcome many opponents in his climb to power; to the present position where he actually dominates our government, and Mr. Truman eats out of his hand. One of the first was Arthur Bliss Lane, whom we have already mentioned. Mr. Acheson won that fight and retired Mr. Lane with relative ease.

Berle, Jr., who first warned Acheson about the Hiss brothers, way back in 1941, or earlier. Berle is certainly no reactionary; he was always an ardent New Dealer. But in 1944 he found himself pressing for a clean-cut showdown with the Russians, while our position was strongest. He has testified under oath as follows: "The opposite group in the State Department was largely the men-Mr. Acheson's group, of course - with Hiss as a principal assistant in the matter. . . . I got trimmed in that fight and, as a result, went to Brazil and that ended my diplomatic career."

Next was Joseph C. Grew, our former Ambassador to Japan, who in 1945 was Undersecretary of State. Acheson was then Assistant Secretary. Grew was opposed to the continuing appearement of the Russians, and was much concerned about the Amerasia revelations. But Grew had served the government for forty-one years, had long passed the age of retirement, was facing the possibility of a major operation, and felt that now the war was over he should be allowed to resign. His insistence on resignation precipitated a savage contest for control in the department. Acheson had Truman's ear, won out, and was made Undersecretary of State in Grew's place. This caused the expected joy in all Communist quarters. 11 The Daily Worker publicly exulted, and so did P.M. Talk of any follow-up of the Amerasia case was immediately stopped. James C. Dunn, another realist about Russia, was got out of the Department by being made Ambassador to Italy. and several other opponents of Acheson, including some real authorities on the Far East, were retired.

Other and later casualties to the pol-

icies and the rising power of Acheson were Major General Patrick Hurley; Lt. General Wedemeyer: James V. Forrestal, who was literally hounded to his death by sinister forces he could not stop; and Louis Johnson. But the greatest enemy of all, the one it took Acheson longest to move out of his way, was General Douglas MacArthur. From his earliest days in the Department of State, Acheson has done everything he could to belittle, hamstring, and discredit the General. And whatever the significance may be, in this course he has followed, and been supported by, the exact Communist line.

From the very beginning Acheson's policies have been based on the contention that Mao and the Chinese Communists were mere agrarian reformers. MacArthur knew better, and has fought that position. Acheson has claimed that the Chiang Kai-shek regime was too riddled with corruption to be supported. (It's an even bet that, entirely aside from the rampant treason, the corruption in Washington has been far worse, but this does not seem to have disturbed Mr. Acheson any.) MacArthur has made no secret of his friendship for Chiang. And despite the years of smear and of deliberate help in the gradual destruction of Chiang by so many pro-Communist forces, Dr. Hu Shih, onetime Chinese Ambassador to the United States and generally recognized as China's greatest scholar, said in 1949 that "Communism is so implacable and intolerant, so diabolically thorough in its indoctrination and so ruthless in enforcing its totalitarian control even in China that Chiang Kai-shek should be supported despite his shortcomings because he alone sees this and has been uncompromising in resisting it ..."

Acheson has moved heaven and earth to support the British position, and have this country follow Britain's lead, in the recognition of Red China. MacArthur has opposed this in every way that he could.

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Acheson has both openly, and insidiously behind the scenes, done everything he could to disparage MacArthur personally. The General's overwhelming success in Japan, despite Acheson's disparagement and active efforts to sabotage MacArthur's program, have kept this campaign from reaching success until this spring. Because of the policies of Acheson and the Acheson clique we have absolutely no friends left in Asia today except the Japanese, the Filipinos, and — until the current betrayal — the South Koreans. They are or were still our friends largely because of MacArthur, and because he is such a personal hero to them. Now MacArthur has been removed, deliberately in such a way that it must connote disgrace in their eyes. And the Voice of America, operated by Mr. Acheson's State Department, has been bleating away continuously with misrepresentations of the reaction to MacArthur's removal in this country. Whatever the purpose may have been, the efforts to show that the American people were practically unanimous in support of Truman's disgrace of their hero must have been terribly discouraging to our remaining Asiatic friends.

It was shortly after Acheson had succeeded Joseph C. Grew as Undersecretary of State that he really went to work openly on MacArthur. The whole Far East Department of the State Department, inspired by Owen Lattimore and his book, Solution In Asia, was bent on having a great social and eco-

nomic revolution in Japan. These schemes required a tremendous army of occupation. The Russians were supporting this position for all they were worth, and were firing all the dirty ammunition they had at MacArthur. They particularly lambasted the General's statement that Japan was calm enough to be occupied by only 200,000 troops. Acheson issued a bitter reprimand, reminding MacArthur that not he, but the State Department was "determining American policy toward Japan." P.M. shouted "Hats off to Dean Acheson." Acheson explained that he had rebuked General MacArthur because he, Acheson, felt the need for a "liberal" government in Japan — a government in whose administration the Soviet Union would have a part. This deliberate confusion of "liberalism" and "communism" has been a consistent theme of Mr. Acheson's utterances - and of course has been the watchword of most pro-Soviet ballyhoo. But as to these arguments about the Japanese occupation, history has already shown who was right; or right, at least, from the point of view of the welfare of the United States and of the Japanese people.

Similar fights had already been going on. Before the Japanese surrender Joseph Grew, his assistant Eugene Dooman, and Joseph Ballantine, then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs — all of whom had had long experience in Tokyo — felt sure that the Japanese would never surrender unless the position of the Emperor was recognized, and that Japan would be ungovernable if the imperial authority was destroyed. This was brilliant farsightedness, based on sound experience —as history since has clearly indicated. Mr. Acheson opposed these views. And

though military events moved so rapidly as to bring a climax before he could prevail, the fight was victorious enough from his point of view to cause the resignations of Dooman and Ballantine. In their stead Acheson immediately brought Owen Lattimore into the fold again, as a member of the Pauley Reparations Commission, and promoted John Carter Vincent to director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Lauchlin Currie, another member of the Acheson team, remained attached to the White House.

This group then continued to advocate measures for the Japanese occupation as proposed in Lattimore's book. These included abolition of the monarchy, banishment of the imperial family to China, dissolution of Japanese business enterprises, a purge of business executives; and taking securities representing ownership of businesses away from their current owners and managers, at a purely nominal price, and selling these securities to farmers' cooperatives and labor unions, many of which were Communist-controlled. MacArthur has shown by every action and every word how much he was opposed to these extreme socialistic and communistic measures; but it was James Forrestal who finally forced a formal reversal of this program, with regard to the Japanese domestic economy, before the pressure of such forces from so many sides caused his death.

It was Acheson and John Carter Vincent who wrote the instructions and the President's statement which was George Marshall's guide for his disastrous year in China. MacArthur made clear his disagreement with such appeasement policies.

Although our War Department well

knew, from its own intelligence reports, the actual nature and purposes of the Chinese Communists, and made their G-2 intelligence reports available to the State Department, Acheson's clique overruled and ignored them. And Acheson has constantly denounced Chiang for refusing to take these Communists into his government. Mac-Arthur has made clear his understanding of the folly of taking Communists into any government — as shown by what happened in Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Czechosłovakia - by refusing to let them into the Japanese government at any point.

Finally, when Chiang's government was at last cracking up, due to our desertion and our support of Mao, and was making its final desperate bid for *some* help, instead of giving help Mr. Acheson's State Department released, on August 5, 1949, its notorious and infamous "White Paper" on China.

Chosen to edit this whitewash of the State Department's ruinous policies towards China over the past several years was Philip C. Jessup. Dr. Jessup was a close friend of Frederick Vanderbilt Field. (Mr. Field, incidentally, has been getting himself into the news rather industriously since my letter was started - including going to jail for refusing to tell who provided the actual bail which he had posted for his four convicted Communist friends now being hunted by the F.B.I.) Dr. Jessup had been closely identified with Field and others of the IPR clique during that campaign against the Chinese Republic. Dr. Jessup had been listed as a sponsor of several Communist fronts. He was a great friend of Alger Hiss, and appeared as a character witness for Hiss at his trial. And of course he was, and is, a protégé of Acheson.

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The New York Times on the whole has certainly supported and looked favorably on the Administration's foreign policies, which means Mr. Acheson's foreign policies over the past few years. But the New York Times said editorially of the "White Paper" that "such a summary could not possibly be objective . . . that the State Department certainly would not inform the President that this effort of theirs was misleading, or that its policies had been mistaken . . . that this inquest on China was not the work of a detached coroner but of a vitally interested party in the catastrophe . . . and that at this point one of these vital interests was self-justification."

One of our best informed writers about the Far Eastern situation has said of the White Paper that it is "a masterpiece of omissions, evasions, tricky halftruths, sly slants and twists to create misleading impressions and to conceal grave misjudgments. Its publication marked the lowest point ever reached

by American diplomacy."

The whole White Paper was a betraval of our ally, Chiang Kai-shek, and a defense of that betrayal. There were many terrible things in it. Even the sixthousand word "summary," which Dean Acheson wrote in the form of a "letter of transmittal" of the White Paper to the President, contains paragraphs which, when considered against the unvarnished historical facts, will literally make you sick in your stomach that an American Secretary of State could put his name to such a document. But probably the worst thing of all about the White Paper was Mr. Acheson's complete before-the-event recognition of the Mao Communists as the conquerors of all

mainland China: something which by no means had yet occurred and could still have been prevented. MacArthur during this time was successfully keeping the Communists from getting even

any real foothold in Japan.

And for a final "finally," to this part of our discussion, Acheson has schemed and maneuvered in every way that he could to have us abandon Formosa. In a secret memorandum, smoked out by the United Press in January, 1950, the State Department advised its attachés abroad to sell the public the idea that Formosa was of no strategic value. The memorandum stated that politically, geographically, and strategically Formosa was in no way especially distinguished or important. When confronted with this memorandum recently, as a contradiction to what he was then saying, Mr. Acheson's only defense was that the State Department had been lying when the memorandum was sent out, in order to save face if Formosa did fall, and that lying was an acceptable instrument of diplomatic policy under such circumstances.

MacArthur has made his contrary views only too plain for the pro-Soviet group. In his statement about Formosa some eighteen months ago which the Administration tried to suppress, he said that the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. And he reemphasized this point of view in his speech to the joint session of Congress.

Since 1945 we have seen Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Manchuria, North Korea, and China lost to Stalin's agents. As a Brooklyn paper said not long ago: It is impossible to believe that stupidity alone has brought this about.

Many men have fought against it: Lane, Berle, Grew, Hurley, Wedemeyer, Clay, Forrestal, and others. Many were men of unusual courage, ability, and prestige. But none had the combination of these qualities necessary to overcome the opposition. MacArthur alone had been successful, up to three months ago, in his part of the world, in holding the Communists back — both in their political and their military efforts. So MacArthur had to be removed.

Many men have spearheaded these policies which were concocted of stupidity and treason in various degrees of combination. We could mention many names here, too, but it is better to omit them. But one man has led all the rest, and that man is Dean Acheson. I do not say that Acheson is a traitor. I do not claim to know his motivation. But by his own expressions of creed and purposes he is an extremely leftwing socialist. The facts make clear that under his increasing sway over our State Department and our whole government, the traitors and their dupes and allies have reached a terrifying position of influence and power. At the best we must put him down as a leader, friend, and protector of these dupes and allies.

In Europe Mr. Acheson has had his way almost completely. The mess we find ourselves in there is too horrible for contemplation. Nobody even wants to fight the Communists. Our former allies want us to fight for them and to pay them huge bribes not to go over to the other side. The Germans hate us and ridicule us. On the mainland of Asia Mr. Acheson has had his way. Man-

churia and China have been handed over to the Communists, Formosa and the Philippines are already threatened. Only in Japan has Acheson not had his way, and there only because of Mac-Arthur. The record speaks for itself.

#### VII Sources and Opinions

This is already a long letter, and still I am afraid it cannot stop here. Up to this point it has been, except for one or two interpolations due to more recent events, almost exactly the speech which I delivered in Portland - of which you saw a very brief report. I had already made the same speech before several other groups, during April. I wish that I could have continued making it, and others I was also making concerning the rapid socialization of our country. But there are personal loyalties and obligations which cannot be ignored. And developments during May made the compulsion of these personal loyalties, to give up political activities for the sake of such heavy other demands on my time, even stronger than the patriotic obligation to keep my voice in the fight. Reluctantly but definitely I have given up all political efforts, even speechmaking, except such as might be proper for any business man and conscientious citizen with a normal interest in good government and public affairs. And this is one reason why I have written you at such length. For I have hoped that, by giving copies of this letter to a few good friends, I might have it serve in some degree to take the place of speeches I should like to make, as my small contribution to a better understanding of the dangers which we face.

When presenting this review verbally,

with an audience in front of me, it has been easy to put in "asides" at the proper places, giving the sources of specific statements and quotations. But to have inserted "As Victor Lasky says" or some similar form of documentation, at every spot where it might reasonably be called for in this narrative, would have encumbered it beyond the point of easy readability. For I wish to repeat that I have only been arranging and rearranging secondhand material.

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d l. To give now anything resembling a bibliography of sources would also give a pretense of scholarship which is the last thing I wish to claim for this effort. But I cannot, with any feeling of honesty, simply ignore the problem altogether. So as humbly as possible I still want to make clear, without any footnote type of formality, at least some of the places where I have found pieces of information that went into this patchwork fabric.

In the first place, I can say honestly that I do read more socialist and Communist publications than anybody else I happen personally to know, And much of the background for this letter has been gathered from the outpourings of the enemy. But among "friendly" sources for such background, of people and personalities involved, I should give particular credit to Marjorie Shearon (Challenge To Socialism), Benjamin Gitlow (The Whole Of Their Lives), Jacob Spolansky (The Communist Trail In America), Robert E. Stripling (The Red Plot Against America), and, for my original instruction in Communist plotters and their ways, to that tremendously earnest idealist, Eugene Lyons (Assignment In Utopia and The Red Decade). For reference, the official publications of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee are always useful. And of course the newspapers and news magazines have been full of grist for this particular mill for years; the job is only to pick out and assemble what is wanted.

For the story primarily of events and incidents, rather than persons, Dr. Hollington Tong's Dateline China has been helpful. Speeches by Senator William E. Jenner and Congressman Walter Iudd have been very much to the point. Copies of broadcasts by Henry J. Taylor have contained some nuggets which I have extracted. Kenneth de Courcy's Intelligence Digest is a periodical gold mine of accurate information on all foreign affairs. A pamphlet, America Betrayed, by Joseph Kamp, put out by the Constitutional Educational League, Inc., has served as a guide for running down connections between groups and individuals, and I have quoted from it almost directly in some places. And the thirteen-hundred-page publication of the State Department itself, "A Decade of American Foreign Policy," would seem to me to offer sufficient evidence for any jury to convict at least Acheson's clique in the State Department of at least criminal stupidity.

From these and literally hundreds of newspaper clippings and other sources, I put together my speech as well as I could. But there was one source so much more important than any other that I have waited to mention it last. That was the brilliant collection of sheer facts and direct quotations compiled by Victor Lasky, in a small brochure called *The Case Against Dean Acheson*. In a couple of sections of this letter I have drawn very heavily on Lasky's essay, not even materially changing his wording at many points because no change

would be an improvement. I am not in the least afraid of any characters in this story suing me for libel, for in order to do so they would have to subject themselves to cross examination under oath. They also would thus bring about a much wider reading of copies of this letter, which is the last thing most of them would want. But if Victor Lasky sues me for plagiarism I can hardly blame him, except that I am giving him blanket credit right now for practically anything he wishes to claim in about a third of these pages. And certainly we are both toilers in the same vineyard. If you want further evidence, read the marvelous book, as interesting as any mystery novel, called The Seeds Of Treason, by Lasky and Toledano, published by Funk & Wagnalls. It is the story of the Alger Hiss trials, and will help to open your eyes.

In your own letter you said that you hated to see me jumping on the Martin-Wherry-MacArthur bandwagon, I hope I have convinced you at least that I was not jumping on anybody's bandwagon; that my thoughts and feelings on this subject were entirely too deep for any such purpose. You brought forth, especially in the copy of your letter to newspaper editors, a number of arguments supporting the Acheson policies against those of MacArthur. It would take too much additional space for me to try to set forth my differing opinions with regard to these various points, and I want to comment on only one. You rather ridicule the idea of our thinking Asiatic territory is important enough to Stalin for us to fight over it with any sizable proportion of our forces, and express the belief that Stalin is trying to trap us into committing large amounts of our war potential to Asia

so that he can grab off Europe more easily. Maybe so, But if so, it is contrary to everything we know about the plans of Russian imperialism, dating back to the dreams of the Czars, which is the only thing the Soviets have taken over. lock, stock and barrel, from the Russian past. The idea that the conquest of Asia, or at least China, had to precede the conquest of Europe, has been a cardinal tenet of Soviet foreign policy from the time they first went to work on China within three years of their original revolution, "The road to Paris is through Peiping" is the way they have put it time and time again, for the guidance of their own party-thinking, and their actions have shown clearly how firmly Stalin and the other Soviet leaders have believed in this long-range strategy themselves.

You said you thought this MacArthur storm was just the kind of false-trail issue which the Republicans habitually picked up, causing them to lose elections, and which, unless they abandoned it promptly, would cause them to lose the 1952 election. And that you were greatly concerned with having Republicans take courses that would enable them to win.

For one thing, I believe you are wrong in your appraisal of the issue. There are three broad areas of argument in which the 1952 political battle can be waged. One is corruption in government, one is the steady encroachment of socialism, and one is foreign policy. An honest fight for principles will require the Republicans to hammer away on all three fronts, rather than try to take some slick position which they think is politically smart. But from the point of view of political strategy, the great opportunity lies in

the third field. For the more than two million Federal office holders and their families, not as a rule feeling strongly enough about corruption in government to throw overboard their own personal stakes in a Democratic victory, can exert a balance of power that is hard to overcome. And the blessings of the handout-state reach too many favored segments of our population for it to be easy to recruit enough revolting individualists from the Democratic ranks. But let these same people, office holders and beneficiaries of New Deal class legislation alike, become convinced that the policies of this administration are really endangering their country, and they will push aside less important matters of self-interest in a stampede to throw out the bunglers, the crooks, and the traitors who have brought us to such a pass. There is no conceivable issue which could so quickly bring the best elements of the Democratic party over in droves, to at least temporary support of Republican leadership, as a conviction that a sizable part of Democratic officialdom was playing directly into Russia's hands. And I believe that the material to convince them of this fact is plentiful and irrefutable, if the Republicans will only have the courage and the straightforwardness to pick it up and use it.

But there is an even more important point that I want to make in this connection. I am a good Republican. And as I have said many times before, I think that the Republican Party is the one practical instrumentality which offers any chance of a return in this country to more honesty and sanity in government and more common sense in our economic thinking. I too am greatly concerned over the need of a

Republican victory. But the impact of what is happening in Washington, and of the devious game our State Department is playing in so many parts of the world, transcends even these soundest reasons for my strong partisanship. Rather than cease to fight the dangerous machinations of the Acheson clique at every turn, in whatever small way my own restricted circumstances will permit, I would abandon the Republican Party in a minute. And I shall try to make my reasons clearer in the concluding section of this letter.

#### VIII Some General Premises

It is now July 14 — Bastille Day, just by chance. It is the anniversary of that day, one hundred and sixty-two years ago, which was supposed to inaugurate freedom from tyranny forevermore.

Writing this letter, in snatches of time that I could spare, has not been any fun. For in the course of my fifty-one years I have learned that the man in whom you see only the bad side today may prove to be a good man fighting on your side tomorrow. I am well aware that the molasses of debating issues catches more favorable attention than the vinegar of personal criticisms. And neither my judgment nor my deeprooted sense of good will towards my fellow man will let me assume the role of bitter critic of individuals without misgivings and reluctance. But it is exactly this civilized tolerance, and the charity of our Christian outlook, that the Communists are counting on, and using ruthlessly, as one of their strongest weapons. When personalities as well as issues become of the very essence of a movement, and that movement seeks our total destruction, it is cowardice and not fairmindedness to skirt around the names of those who are used by the enemy.

Writing the rest of this letter will be even less fun, because honesty will require that I appear as an alarmist. And it is an obviously wise generalization that an alarmist seldom gets anybody excited except himself. I can write these remaining pages as I do only because I am frankly and deeply frightened. And with every paragraph I shall be hoping, but not believing, that the extent of my fright is not really justified.

For we can begin this conclusion with certain definite premises which seem, to me at least, to be factually established

beyond all doubt.

The first is that the Soviet leaders are, without exception, murderers, liars, thieves, and ruthlessly cruel tyrants. I do not mean these words to be mere epithets, but specific and accurate descriptions. Their very dogma has for three decades made virtues of these characteristics, and only those members of the Communist party who are unhesitatingly capable of using any foulness to achieve an end have any chance whatsoever of rising to positions of leadership. The lives and the suffering of millions of Chinese or of millions of Ukrainian kulaks or of miscellaneous millions of their slave labor battalions mean no more to Stalin or Mao or Molotov or Malik than the lives and suffering of millions of ants.

We hear a great deal about Americans having lost their sense of moral values, and their capacity for indignation at the manifest and brazen corruption in our governments. Unfortunately, there is much truth to the accusation. But to my mind even this sign of moral degeneration is not nearly so disturbing

as our calm acceptance of the barbaric brutalities of Communist monsters everywhere. These men are not human beings, they are predatory beasts; atavisms throwing back to the days of the Assyrians, constantly engaging without the slightest shame in bestialities that the human race thought it had outgrown and left behind with the fall of Nineveh eighty generations ago.

The second premise is that the Communist inner circle has never wavered. and will never waver in the slightest or for an instant, in its determination to conquer and rule the world; and that Stalin thoroughly expects, within his lifetime, to make slaves, completely subject to his personal power, of every human being on the planet. His obsession with this epic ambition is the only possible explanation of a thousand different procedures that have unrolled right before our eyes. This megalomaniacal dream on the part of imaginative tyrants has been one of the horrible factors in the sociological currents of the past fifty years. It must be charged on the debit side, in appraisal of that rapid decrease in the size of our world brought about by scientific wonders in transportation and communications.

The third premise is that Stalin and his subordinates will use every means, of treachery, of diplomacy, of propaganda, of murderous liquidation of millions of potential enemies, of military destructiveness, of outlawed methods of warfare, of temporary compromise, of fifth-column infiltration, of carefully fomented confusion, and of recruiting power-seeking Quislings to his standard in every country, to achieve this ambition. We see every single one of these means being widely used, or in preparation for use—even to bacteriological

warfare - already as visible and incontrovertible facts.

The fourth premise is that Communist infiltration into our government, and the recruiting and planting of Communist traitors in spots of vital control in every important branch of our economic, political, and cultural life, has already gone far beyond the wildest guess of the average American citizen. Documentation of this fact is so easy and so simple that even I could put together a letter longer than this one full of nothing but names and incidents to support it. The Communists themselves have boasted that their organization in this country is like a submerged submarine; we see only the periscope. In the article in the July 14 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, concerning conferences in Moscow in July, 1947, in which the Czech, Arnhost Heidrich, participated, the two most significant sentences are these: "Heidrich sensed that Stalin believed deeply that the American Government was not really master in its own house. He, Stalin, was the real master of the situation." And Whittaker Chambers accurately complained that the personal drama of the Hiss trial had served to divert attention from the really important part of the picture, which was the magnitude of the Communist conspiracy in this country.

Fifth, the smoke screen thrown up to keep us from getting a clear look at even the periscope of this Communist apparatus is becoming constantly thicker, darker, and more difficult to penetrate. (1) The traitors and their dupes and allies belch it out in unceasing volume; (2) the whole power of the Truman administration is used as a bellows to blow it in the directions most needed;

(3) the you-scratch-my-back-I-scratch-your-back socialists cooperate with their Communist friends, frequently not even beginning to realize how they are being used, to add their tens of thousands of little black clouds; (4) and even our good American newspapers, feeling that they must constantly be proving how "liberal" and "tolerant" they are, dim their search-lights or turn them the other way.

(1) There reached my desk today a new book by the same IPR crowd, published in 1951, for which I paid five dollars. The list of authors of its different chapters, and of more than forty authors of books on Asia in general, or on China specifically, referred to in its bibliography, reads like a Who's Who among Communists and fellow travelers connected with the sell-out of Chiang Kai-shek. I opened the book at random, to Page 32, and read that much as a sample of the whole that I would get to later. I have never seen as much or as clever distortion of the facts, or net falsification of a record, in any other one page of anything called history. Yet this book of several hundred pages looks completely plausible to anybody who has not taken the trouble to dig below the surface of pro-Communist propaganda.

(2) When the Un-American Activities Committee was investigating the Whittaker Chambers charges against Alger Hiss, the greatest worry of Representative Nixon and other members of the Committee was that the United States Department of Justice would succeed in putting a stop to the investigation, or to any charges against Hiss, even after the Department had impounded sixty-five documents substantiating Chambers' charges. President

Truman has insisted that investigations of Communist activities were "red herrings," and let the full power of his office be used to hamstring them. A long letter from the F.B.I. concerning the extended Communist associations of one high government officer has been highhandedly withheld by Truman despite a ten-to-one Congressional vote demanding its release. The State Department, denying at every turn that there were any pro-Communists in its ranks, and fighting every disclosure, still was forced to drop 151 people from its payroll for subversive activities in a twenty-four months period; and has still gone on hiring, protecting, and promoting pro-Communists with greater fervor than ever. Since the first seven sections of this letter were written the State Department, apparently in fear of actions of the McCarran Committee, has suspended, as a "poor security risk," that same John P. Davies, referred to far above, who had been fired from Chungking by Pat Hurley, as a pro-Communist, in 1945. In the meantime he had continued under Dean Acheson, for all the years in between, to be "a member of Secretary of State Acheson's top level policy planning staff." Dropped with him for similar reasons at the same time was another notorious character, O. Edmund Clubb, who was, significantly, Director of the Office of China Affairs. It is reported that the records of some fifty others are being "re-examined." But you can bet your bottom dollar that they will all be replaced by others of the same ilk — and that most of them will again wind up somewhere in the State Department. More important, and pertinent to these immediate paragraphs, is that neither you nor any government committee will

ever be able to learn one-tenth of what they may have done to forward the Communist cause.

(3) Not too long ago a left-wing opportunist, Avedis Boghos Derounian, was being sued for libel. Under one of his many aliases, John Roy Carlson, he had written a book called Under Cover, full of vicious smears about many good and patriotic Americans. The purport of his book, and basis for his smears, was that anybody who opposed Communists or Communism, or who could even be remotely connected with those who opposed Communism, was a Fascist conspirator. At the end of this particular trial the respectable presiding judge felt impelled to go further than merely awarding damages to the plaintiff. He gave a tongue-lashing to the publisher, stating that a man who would publish such a book would do anything for money. Yet, thanks to widespread and favorable reviews, that book sold over seven hundred thousand copies.

We have heard a great deal about Communist infiltration in Hollywood. It has actually become domination rather than infiltration. The F.B.I. has the names of thirty-three card-bearing Communists in the very top echelons of the movie headquarters — directors, authors, and writers. There are at least one hundred and fifty of these top-flight movie people who have shown themselves by their actions to be strongly sympathetic to the Stalinist conspiracy. The fact that it was intellectually fashionable, and so much easier to get to the top in Hollywood if you were a sympathizer, had a great deal to do with drawing so many into the net.

The same thing is true of so many other fields of work which involve media for influencing American public fu

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opinion, including the book-reviewing profession. There are today hopeful signs of a return to more fairmindedness and objectivity in some quarters such as the New York Times. There are plenty of able, informed, patriotic, and objective book reviewers still left. of course, just as there are still many "movie greats" untouched by the Communist brush; but they have both been carrying a heavy handicap load. During recent years, in the book-review columns of the Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Saturday Review of Literature, and the New Republic, people like Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow, John K. Fairbank, Owen Lattimore, Annalee Jacoby and their kind have played to the hilt the game of praising each other's books - with front pages in the book sections and ample space conveniently provided them; and of tearing down, when they could not manage to have the publications completely ignore, such books as W.L. White's Report on the Russians, or George Creel's Russia's Race for Asia, or Freda Utlev's Last Chance in China. The fact that Lewis Gannett, book review editor of the Herald Tribune, has been mentioned seventeen times by the House Un-American Activities Committee as among the subjects of their investigations is revealing. As is his free plug for the literary efforts of Mr. Howard Fast - since sentenced to jail for refusing to tell Congress whether or not he was a Communist.

These top-flight pinks set the pace, largely for ideological or long-range conspiratorial purposes. But the plain matter of personal prestige and of making a living reinforces the presure all down the line. The book to which I referred in (1) will go on to get huge

and grand reviews. For it has long been clear even to the lesser lights that the way to win big reputations as book reviewers, and the emoluments such reputations bring, is to turn out favorable reviews at every chance of this kind. The way to get smeared, and called an ignorant hack - and ultimately to be out of work - is to give this book a poor - or an honest - review. With the help of wide and favorable reviews the book will go on to attain a huge sale, and to be placed in every sizable library in the country; and to make a lot of money for its publisher. There are hundreds of such books flooding the country all of the time. I ordered two more just today. One of them, at five dollars, with an extremely solid-sounding historical title, is by a man who, despite his innocent sounding name being completely unknown to the average unsuspecting reader, has been an active and ardent Communist sympathizer, on three continents and for many years.

(4) Right up practically till the time Alger Hiss was finally convicted and sentenced, the Boston Herald was blasting away editorially at those foul witchhunting bigots beneath contempt who were low enough to persecute such a noble American as Alger Hiss. It was already perfectly obvious, to anybody who would take the trouble to study the known evidence objectively, that Hiss was a particularly cunning and vindictive liar, who was using every dirty trick he knew to forwad the Communist cause. But this editorial was typical of the kind of press that everybody has had to face who has tried to penetrate the smoke screen. The Boston Herald is one of our better newspapers, which is why I selected it for this illustration instead of such mouthpieces

of bias as the Washington Post or the Raleigh News And Observer. It certainly has not been infiltrated by pro-Communists. And as a general rule—except possibly when it goes on a specific political binge—the Herald presents "conservative" and "liberal" news and columnists in a fair degree of balance. But at least some of its editorial writers constantly feel that they must flaunt their "liberalism" by making it as uncomfortable as possible for anybody trying to get at the truth about a Hiss, a Remington, or "Doctors" Jessup and Lattimore.

Here again I have picked up just a few tiny straws for illustration, out of a haystack the size of a mountain. Here again even I could fill a hundred pages with names and incidents exactly to the point. But I must move towards the end.

A sixth premise is that Stalin, at long last, is approaching the position where he will be willing to add war to the other means he has so far been using. Up till now he has taken over country after country by treason within; in many cases, such as those of Poland and China, with the active help and connivance of the Truman administration and our State Department. He was neither able, ready, nor willing to risk the actual use of armed forces. And at any step within the past five years he could have been stopped cold by a firm show of force in the place of the constant and even anxious appeasement which was offered him.

The idiocies that the American people have been sold by the State Department since 1944 are legion. But no other idiocy, not even that of the Mao Communists being "agrarian reformers," has quite approached the brazen duplicity of the continuously repeated excuse

that Stalin must be allowed to have his way, in one grab and one breach of agreement and one murderous betraval of our friends after another, because otherwise he might start a third world war. It was known to anybody with the slightest powers of observation that neither agreements nor moral scruples nor any civilized consideration would hold Stalin back from war when he was ready for war; that nothing would provoke him into war until he was ready; and that if he were ready for war he would already be fighting. It was Stalin's time table that we were following, and Stalin to whom we were giving needed time, rather than ourselves.

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But now time is running out. Thanks to the Allan Nunn Mays, the Klaus Fuchses, the Pontecorvos, the Rosenbergs, and all the treason of which they were only the tiny part that has been exposed, Stalin now has the atom bomb. The private intelligence authority that disclosed several months ahead just when the Russians would explode their first test bomb, and which announced the explosion to the world the very day it happened, says that Stalin is and for a long time has been stockpiling atom bombs at the rate of four a month; and that he is considerably ahead of us in development of the hydrogen bomb. That same authority, which has not once been wrong in a period of years, states categorically that in less than twenty-four months Stalin will have all of Iran's oil.15 He has German scientists adding to his huge fleet of advanced-type submarines, building jet engines for his airplanes, and developing all other deadly weapons that have so far been conceived. Through his lieutenant Mao he has conquered main-

land China, the first great nation, and source of unending manpower, to be added to his resources. His agents are everywhere; in Cuba there are known to be more than fifty thousand Communists; in Panama they have operated so successfully, according to Hallett Abend, "that today the Panama Canal is admittedly indefensible"; the amount of Communist strength in Hawaii has already paralyzed the islands twice in four years. In South and Central America there are now half a million Communist agents, under the disciplined control of the infamous Jan Drohojowski. In our own country there is now, according to J. Edgar Hoover, one Communist (actual party member) for every 1814 persons against one Communist for every 2277 persons in Russia at the time they overthrew the Russian government. And their power is magnified out of all proportion to their numbers by the help of their dupes and allies, and by the strategic positions in which they have put themselves.

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Time is running out. The strongest indication of this is that Stalin has already had his rehearsal, which is such a cardinal point in his cunning practicality. As he explained to Winston Churchill, it is necessary "to blood your troops" before the big trial comes. He fomented and used the Spanish Civil War as a testing ground for weapons and a training ground for guerilla troops, in advance of the war with Hitler that he knew was on the way.

Stalin obviously wanted us to fight back in Korea, for the same purpose. (To put it bluntly, we would not have fought in Korea if Stalin had wished otherwise. We pulled our troops out of South Korea because he wanted us to. We announced that we would not defend Korea because he wanted us to. We ignored the clearest repeated warnings of the forthcoming attack, because he wanted us to, until the very day he struck. And we reversed our position and fought back, after getting the odds stacked against ourselves in every imaginable way, because he wanted us to, and pulled the strings. You find any other conceivable explanation.) He wanted a chance to test his jet planes and other engines of war, and to "blood" his Asiatic troops in battles with Western soldiery. Undoubtedly he expected to wipe us off the peninsula in easy order, adding terrific prestige to his bluff of invincibility in arms, and giving his Chinese soldiers, and their Russian advisors and bosses, a terrific boost in confidence. That this did not work out quite as expected was due to the independent Americanism of MacArthur, the daring military genius of MacArthur which conceived and executed the Inchon landing, and the courage of the vastly outnumbered men under him. But even then Stalin was sure enough of being master within our house not to run any real risk. He could ensure that his troops and planes fought from protected sanctuaries; and that, if and whenever he thought it best, all he had to do was to consent to stop the war, on terms which would still be a disgrace to America and could readily be sold as a huge Communist victory by his Asiatic propaganda machines. Our representatives marching with a white flag into a formal assemblage of armed Communists, in a spot held by the Communists below the 38th parallel, to have their pictures thus taken for dissemination all over Asia, proved how well-founded was his assurance. The peace terms eventually to be

worked out will prove it even more disgracefully. The one and only thing that had to be done, to bring this about—and to avoid the possibility that the United States forces might actually and eventually stop fighting with their hands tied behind their backs—was the removal of MacArthur. The rehearsal is now over. Despite seventy thousand American casualties, the most important single result has been a devastation of a friendly country, so severe and so complete as to furnish terrific propaganda to Stalin's agents everywhere else concerning the folly of resistance.

Time is running out. Evidence is piling up on many sides and from many sources that October, 1952, is the fatal month when Stalin will attack. I should like to explore that evidence, too, but it would take an additional several pages. I must go on to my seventh, and last,

premise.14 16

The war that Stalin will begin when ready will be totally unlike anything this country or any other great nation has ever faced before. It will be external war, civil war, guerrilla war, atomic war, bacteriological war and war with every civilized rule as to uniforms or prisoners or decency of any kind thrown completely overboard by our enemy. It will use the murder of civilian millions, by firing squads behind the lines, as a routine instrument of conquest. It will begin with A-bombs exploding at vital centers, catastrophic sabotage of railroads, airlines, and industrial plants, and a simultaneous seizure of power in many spots by armed fifth columnists. Robert Stripling, who spent ten thankless years exposing Communist traitors in this country, and who did expose a great many despite every obstacle these traitors and their dupes

and allies in various government departments could put in his way, says: "It is incontrovertible that every key point, strategically, in the United States has been studied faithfully against the day when peaceful-looking American Reds will be called upon to come into the open and fight for Mother Russia."

In expectation of that approaching day the Quislings in our midst are already getting more brazen, more arrogant, and more confident. For they feel that they have to hang on only so much longer. Then they will be the government and you and I will be the traitors to that government. Treason has to prosper only so far, and then none dare call it treason. We are already dangerously near that edge. Alarmism? Merciful heavens, my good friend and good fellow American, look in front of you. This has been happening right before your eyes. It happened in the Ukraine. It happened in Poland, in Roumania, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia. In many of these places, God forgive us, we have helped it to happen. Every trustworthy report we get out of China tells us of the thousands who are being murdered in cold blood every day. The total, before the purge is finished, will be many times the huge number of Chinese our soldiers killed in the Korean war. One estimate, by a pro-Communist, of the troops and civilians combined that have already been killed by the Mao forces, is "in the neighborhood of 14,000,000."

I happened to be in Paris the day Czechoslovakia fell, a little over three years ago. As a result, the impact of that tragic fall was much greater on me than if I had been in Belmont, Massachusetts. The Czechs were not poverty-stricken Chinese, nor unlettered

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Ukrainian peasants, nor nomadic tribes of some non-industrialized wasteland. They were among the most civilized, hardest working, most law-abiding, best educated people in all of Europe. And they were so sure that "it couldn't happen to them." They were playing the game sensibly. They had liberalized and broadened their government; they had taken in the Communists, in a proper Democratic way, and even had a Communist deputy premier and other Communist officials mixed in with their ministers of other parties. They were recovering prosperity, not rapidly but surely. And the future looked glorious ahead, as such wisdom deserved. Or so they believed, and boasted, of all these things, right up till the hour the blow struck. The rest is history, from which we well might learn.

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The seventh and last premise is that the allies, on whom we are supposedly depending so much as to let our policies be swayed by their desires and fears, are even more vulnerable to the Soviet fifth column than we are ourselves, in either a hot war or a continued cold one. Just a few comments about the British picture will have to suffice, to indicate the substantiation of this premise which would be possible in a separate letter on the subject.

Most of the effective thefts of atomic bomb secrets from our laboratories and archives have been achieved by men who were passed as security risks by the *British government*, and alllowed their opportunities by our government supposedly on the strength of this British clearance. Allan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, and Pontecorvo were all white-haired boys of the *British* government. There is other and ample evidence that the permeation of actual spies and trai-

tors into the British government has exceeded their boring into ours. Within the past few weeks this fact has been highlighted again by the disappearance, obviously behind the Iron Curtain, of MacLean and Burgess. Despite the fact that MacLean was known to have been associated with the Communist Party in England at one time, he was Chief of the American Department in the British Foreign Office. He had access to, and knowledge of, a tremendous number of top secret communications, not all necessarily connected with his department. Burgess, though a lesser light, was also known to have had dangerous Communist associations. Yet, just as in hundreds of similar situations in both the British government and ours, these men had been allowed to stay in positions where espionage, much of it at the very top level, was extremely easy. When they first disappeared in France, somebody in the British government fumbled or deliberately withheld passing this information on to the French government until too late; until MacLean and Burgess had been shuffled behind the Iron Curtain. And the British government has made every effort it could to keep the facts about this whole occurrence from being exposed. Shades of Amerasia!

Lord Vansittart has recently stated that a very large number of pro-Communist officials are in the government; that they protect each other and use their official influence to keep anybody from giving the full facts about the Soviet to the public; that the extent of Communist influence is immense; and that Russia's friends and agents are placed in key positions. There are plenty of other authorities to support Lord Vansittart's allegations; but there are

extremely powerful forces to prevent anything being done about them.

In 1939 the British Labor Party was an extremely left-wing organization. Yet at conventions held specifically for that purpose, in the fall of 1939 and the spring of 1940, Sir Stafford Cripps, Aneurin Bevan, and G. R. Strauss were kicked completely out of the Labor Party as being too pro-Communist even for that group. They did not get back in the party until 1944. But when the Socialists came to power in 1945 these men became perhaps the three most powerful in the government, and remained so for several years. John Strachev was once held up at Ellis Island and refused admission to the United States as a Communist. He claims to have abandoned Russian Communism in 1940. but is not so positive about communism as an ideology or as it might be spelled with a little "c". Strachey has been Minister of War in the British cabinet for most of the years of Russia's great expansion. At least one other British cabinet officer is notorious for his known former Communist sympathies.

As for the extent to which treason in England has already prospered, to the point where it dares come right out in the open and brazenly defy anybody to call it treason, please note this: Less than a month ago an official representative of the British Foreign Office stated in a public speech that South Korea had started the fighting, and that the only aggressor in the Far East was America, Time is truly running out!

Those who believe that there is anything unduly alarmist about any of these lines have my hopes and prayers that they are right. But the evidence otherwise is like the light of a noonday sun.

#### IX Conclusion

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And now finally, in about two pages, shall be through. I return to your original letter, and the firing of Mac-Arthur. It is my utterly sincere belief that, through whatever strings may have been pulled and whatever puppets activated to exert their combined insidious pressures, MacArthur was fired by Stalin. He had to be removed. Otherwise he might have ultimately had his way, and have blown the Chinese Communists and their supply bases right off the Manchurian landscape. Chiang Kaishek was in position to do it once, and truces were forced on him, by American diplomatic pressures, to prevent it. Diplomacy is a wonderful thing if you own all the diplomats on one side and a sufficient number on the other.

The next American obstacle on the Communist schedule to be removed is undoubtedly J. Edgar Hoover. Hamstrung as the F.B.I. is by being an adjunct of the highly political Justice Department, and discouraged and frustrated as the F.B.I. men feel on having their most carefully substantiated investigations of Communist subversives ignored when prosecutions are sought, the F.B.I. so far is still in position to pick up about 25,000 known Communist agents in this country on short notice. This is a powerful threat to their strength which the Communists cannot ignore. Whatever its significance may be, it is worth noting that a little over a year ago one of Dean Acheson's former law partners began circulating a petition demanding as "imperative in the public interest" that there be a public investigation of the "lawless conduct of the F.B.I." Perhaps this maneuver was found to be premature. In the face

of rising criticism the attack was turned off. But there have been others, such as the viciously distorted book by Max Lowenthal, a White House favorite. And that there will be new ones, more aggressively continued, you can be sure.

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For all my pessimism as to the prospects ahead of us, I have no doubt as to the ultimate outcome. However crippled America may be, by traitors inside and by the destructiveness of the external enemy, I am sure that the shattered remnant of our people and of our industrial and military might will be able to rise, fight, and coalesce, and win. But it is the cost, the so bitterly unnecessary cost, of victory in such wise, that makes me shudder as though in a horrible nightmare. And the unbroken trend of events but makes that

nightmare worse. Every time we allow a Grew or a Dooman, a Berle or a Lane to be pushed out of their path by the Soviet conspirators we are just making the eventual holocaust that much more certain and more deadly. I believe, as do many others, that a sufficiently firm stand could still stop Stalin, at this terribly late hour, short of the fatal plunge; that not his intentions, but at least his time-schedule, could be disrupted simply by our beginning to show, by actions and words, that we recognize as beasts rather than men the monsters who control the Soviet tyranny, and by our taking steps to protect ourselves in accordance with this realization. I believe, as do many others, that any such show of ordinary hard-headedness and determination on our part would inspire spasmodic but increasing insurrections against this tyranny, in the satellite countries and even within the so-called Soviet republics themselves;

and that even moral support from us, which could be depended on, might well be sufficient to encourage a revolt of growing strength, sufficient at last to send the whole Stalinist hierarhy fleeing like frightened dogs in search of hiding places. So far we have actually helped to betray millions and millions of decent people who would have been glad to fight on our side. The removal of a man like MacArthur, aside from depriving us of one of our ablest soldiers in either the cold war or a hot one, is notice to all these would-be friends that the Soviet plotters are masters of our government today, just as they were masters of the governments within the countries of these friends long before such mastery became official. And to allow Dean Acheson to remain as Secretary of State, with the other positions of official as well as unofficial influence in our government which he also holds, is under present circumstances like allowing a precocious child to play with matches and firecrackers, wherever he pleases, in the various departments of a huge powder factory.

Communism as an ideology is just one of Stalin's tools. With it, and with the more direct methods of a ruthless organization that stops at nothing, he is tearing down our civilized world so as to stand astride it. He is doing so just when American production methods, spreading throughout an unregimented and uncurtained world, could have brought an increasing measure of personal freedom and a gradually rising standard of living to individuals everywhere. What is happening right before our eyes is by far the greatest tragedy in the history of mankind. The danger which is so imminently confronting

### May God Forgive Us

America, and the malignity of the force now doing incalculable ruin, piece by piece, in a world to which America now owes leadership, transcend all questions of the Republican Party against the Democratic Party, or of political advantage. But it took nine years for Whit-

taker Chambers to get anybody in our government to listen to his story and do anything about it. As was wisely written a long time ago, there are none so blind as those who will not see.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. W. WELCH, JR.

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### A POSTSCRIPT

February 22, 1952

Dear Mr. Regnery:

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Publication of this paper, to meet the demand for copies, has become a necessity. And I am grateful for your confidence and courage, in putting on it the imprint of your company and in taking the business risk involved.

But it is still with deep regret that I see the treatise published in this form. It is such a fragmentary and unfinished work. As it changes status, from an informal letter duplicated by friends, to a semi-historical essay given the dignity of print, there is so much more that needs to be said to round out the picture.

For the preceding pages delineate a pattern that has been repeated since Teheran like the design in a piece of wallpaper. With a few changes in names and dates the story becomes that of Poland or of Yugoslavia. It is conceivable that the fortuitous interplay of political, diplomatic, and military forces could produce in one country, such as China, an improbable tragedy. But when remarkably parallel developments have produced remarkably similar catastrophes in other parts of the world; when the same identical methods of deception, betrayal, and brutality, speeded by the same acceptance and even welltimed support by agencies of our government, have been successful in country after country; when our aid to an aggressive tyrant, defended even at the best as opportunistic appeasement, has followed so regular a form that its course can be charted in advance; in the light of such experience it is not unreasonable to ask just how far the long arm of coincidence can reach.

As we have moved from openly "helping our Soviet ally" to "containment of Communism" to "standing up against Stalin," only the phrases have been altered. As to the direction of the forces working behind the scenes, and as to the results achieved by these forces year after year, the plain present facts tell a story there is no refuting. In some manner, made inexplicable by a planned confusion, even our steps of supposed resistance - such as Korea - work out to be victories for the Kremlin. Never has there been a better illustration of the old French proverb that the more it changes the more it is just the same thing.

There is no change in the Communist formula of conquest, nor in the variables — one of which is always our assistance — manipulated by that formula. The only change is in the coefficients of those variables. I tried hard, in the long letter, to define that formula by tracing its application to China. I had hoped and planned to try just as hard, in other long letters, to make the formula a great deal more obvious by recounting its exactly similar application to other countries.

But one man can do only so much, and my responsibilities over the past many months have been varied and heavy. Now the definite publication plans mean that time has closed in on me, and maybe space as well. I am going to find *some* time, nevertheless, for a small part of what so badly needs to be added, and shall do my utmost to persuade you to find the necessary space. To avoid wasting either I shall plunge ahead.

II POLAND GOES FIRST

In 1683, when John Sobieski, by lifting the siege of Vienna, saved much of Europe from being overrun by the Turks, Poland was one of the great powers of the continent. But it had three weaknesses and dangers, the combination of which was gradually to prove fatal. One was that it was an elective monarchy, a contradiction in the logic of government which alone was disastrous. The second was a provision in the Polish constitution of a liberum veto, whereby any one member of parliament, even if openly bribed for that purpose by a foreign power, could prevent any action he didn't like by dissolving the parliament itself or by threatening to do so. (The origin of the veto in the United Nations charter lies, of course, in Stalin's familiarity with Polish history, and with the value of such a monkey wrench to be tossed at will into any governmental machinery.) The third was simply the brazen hunger of Poland's neighbors, especially Russia, for her territory.

Less than one hundred years later the combination of these corroding factors led to the first partition, whereby Poland lost, to Russia, Austria, and Prussia, one-fifth of her population and onefourth of her area. By the second partition, in 1793. Poland was reduced to one-third of her original dimensions. And by the third partition among exactly the same powers, in 1796, Poland ceased to exist. Despite the ephemeral Grand Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon and fought for with such futility by Poniatowski and his brave patriots, and despite the amorphous "Congress Kingdom" which had Russian Tsars as its sovereigns for fifty years, there was no nation of Poland again until Woodrow Wilson restored it, in 1919, through the Treaty of Versailles.

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The first Premier was Ignace Paderewski, as good a friend of America as we ever had. The Poles, through all of their tumultuous history, have remained a proud, brave, and intensely nationalistic people. They were extremely appreciative of the part played by the United States, supported by England and France, in the re-establishment of their dismembered country. Friendship with these western republics, and distrust of both the Russian and German dictatorships, was the keynote of Polish foreign policy in the period between the two wars. Here again the sequel is made more sad by the fact that it was our best friends we betrayed.

The fourth partition of Poland, between Stalin and Hitler in 1939, set off the Second World War. England entered the fight to back up its guarantee to Poland against such encroachment. The preservation of the national independence and established boundaries of Poland, and of any country similarly attacked by any tyrannical aggressor, was the high-sounding theme of the Atlantic Charter, under which we also edged our way into the holocaust. These facts make the sequel not only a greater tragedy, but an epic for the ages in the category of callous and cynical hypo-Crisv.

When Hitler broke his alliance with Stalin, and invaded Russia, his forces immediately overran all of Poland, including that part ceded to Russia in the partition of two years before. And the Germans held this Polish territory until very near the end of the war. But the Poles and their leaders never gave up fighting. A coalition Polish Govern-

ment In Exile was established, at first in France and then in London. Led at first by Sikorski, until he was killed in an airplane accident in 1943, and then by Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, this government maintained close relations with the best and most effective underground resistance army in Europe, commanded in Poland by General Bor-Komorowski.

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After Stalingrad the Germans began to retreat; and the Russians gradually followed, to the banks of the Vistula. On the other side, in Warsaw, were General Bor and two hundred and fifty thousand underground troops, awaiting the time and the word to break into open insurrection against their German conquerors. On July 30, 1944, General Bor's radio picked up a broadcast in Polish, from the Moscow radio, signed by Molotov. It said: "Poles, the time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms! Make every Polish home a stronghold against the invader. There is not a moment to lose!"

The next day a similar broadcast, from Moscow, was heard in London. Premier Mikolajczyk, who had been promised aid for the Warsaw insurrectionists by Stalin himself, immediately left for Moscow, and this fact was communicated to the Warsaw patriots. General Bor, believing that Russian military aid was at hand, gave the order to revolt.

The whole affair was, of course, a typically ruthless Stalin trap. The Russian army stopped advancing. While General Bor's guerilla forces fought with bravery never surpassed, but without tanks, airplanes, or heavy artillery, against fully equipped German units—and caused the complete demolishment of their great city of Warsaw in the

process — Stalin refused even to allow airplanes to drop supplies which the insurgents so desperately needed.

Despite spectacular early successes, at the end of two months the whole Polish Home Army was completely annihilated. This of course had been the purpose of the ruse. For otherwise the patriots in that army might later have fought as valiantly against the Russian tyrant as they did against the German.

(This pitiless horror was part and parcel of that cruel farsightedness which had caused Stalin, five years before, to send to slave labor camps in Russia, from that part of Poland which the pact with Hitler had put in his hands, and while that pact lasted, 1,200,000 leading Polish citizens in mass deportations. These were the solid and substantial members of each community, who might later have caused him trouble. It was but a different variation of the Katyn Massacre, in which ten thousand captured Polish army officers, separated from their troops and concentrated in one group, were shot down in cold blood by bullets through the backs of their skulls, and their bodies piled in a huge mass grave in the forest near Smolensk. These trained and patriotic officers might later have been troublesome, too.)

In the meantime betrayal on the diplomatic front was more than keeping pace with betrayal on the military front. On July 30, 1941, in the days of Stalin's great need after Hitler's attack, the Soviet Government had entered into a pact with the Polish Government In Exile, making the two nations allies against Germany. But even in this instrument Stalin had refused recognition<sup>12</sup> of Poland's 1939 boundaries; and Premier Sikorski, under strong pressure

from the British government, and despite the resignation of several members of his cabinet over the matter, signed the pact without this provision being included. By early December, 1941, the Soviet Government was conscripting soldiers for its own army from Poland's eastern provinces, and stating that "the question of the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland has not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future."

When Anthony Eden visited Moscow later that month Stalin was already claiming that part of Poland which he had taken, in the partition with Hitler, as permanently his own. And the British Government - which had gone to war ostensibly to protect Poland's boundaries - was already willing to concede Stalin's claim! That claim was held up temporarily by two patriotic career men in our State Department, James C. Dunn and Ray Atherton both of whom have long since been pushed out. They got Secretary Hull to state flatly that the American Government would not accept any such Soviet claim to Polish provinces.

In May of 1942 Hull was still standing firm, and the Anglo-Soviet twentyyears treaty was signed in London without the recognition of Soviet pretensions to Polish territory. But this was the last stand. As the building up of pro-Soviet sentiment mushroomed in this country; as actual traitors and their dupes and allies crept into positions of greater influence in our government; as Stalin became deliberately more truculent and demanding, enabling his agents in the British government and in our government to capitalize on his implied threats to make a separate peace with Hitler; and as our lend-lease help

to Russia and our own armed might both grew, thus reducing Stalin's fears of Hitler; as these changes came there came a corresponding change in Stalin's attitude towards the Polish Government in London, towards the Polish "question," and towards a lot of other things with which we are not concerned here. And our own attitude of firmness melted away under these insidious pressures, right while the military strength to back up such firmness was steadily gaining stature.

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In April, 1943, the Kremlin broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government In Exile on trumped-up rounds. Both the American and British Governments then became increasingly ready to sacrifice Polish territory in order to placate Stalin. By May, 1943, Roosevelt, Hopkins and their cohorts had already reached a decision to accept the Soviet stand that Poland's eastern boundaries must be changed. Sumner Welles for our government and Lord Halifax for the British government began urging on the Polish ambassador in Washington the necessity of concessions. At the Teheran Conference, in December, 1943, as came out much later, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with Stalin to make the so-called Curzon Line the eastern boundary of Poland — in other words, to give all of Eastern Poland to Russia.

By some kind of diplomatic reasoning that is beyond the ken of us ordinary mortals, it was decided to salve the Churchill-Roosevelt consciences and compensate Poland for this lost territory by giving it a roughly equivalent amount of East Germany. For this purpose millions of Germans were to be expelled from land that had been German for centuries, and made refugees,

while millions of Poles were to be put under the brutal power of the hostile Russian police state. All of this was decided without even consulting a single Pole, while Polish patriots were fighting heroically in the allied armies all over Europe, and the Polish underground army was keeping huge German forces immobilized in Poland.

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Mr. Churchill took the lead in these particular "let's please Stalin" measures, because Mr. Roosevelt had a large Polish vote in this country and a fourth term to worry about. And right up through 1944 Roosevelt was consistently lying to Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk about American intentions, although he had long since assented to the Teheran arrangement. Churchill so declared in the British parliament, and confirmed the fact officially in a major conference.

On January 19, 1944, our government offered to act as mediator in restoring Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations. It was clear that acceptance of the territorial reshuffling agreed upon at Teheran was to be a basis for these discussions. But the Communists, in complete consistency with one of their most overworked and successful techniques, themselves rejected the offer. Having just barely won their point, thus knowing that the weak-kneed allies were willing to concede that much, they immediately held out for more. Their note of reply demanded that the Polish Government In Exile be reconstituted, to include Communist elements and to eliminate anti-Communist elements, before it could be considered fit to treat with representatives of the Kremlin.

All of this time, we know now, Stalin did not have the slightest intention of reaching any kind of accord with

the Polish Government, or expectation of seeing it made over sufficiently to satisfy him. He had an entirely different ace up his sleeve, and was just play-

ing for time and confusion.

For the Polish Committee of National Liberation, later to be known diplomatically as the Provisional Government Of Poland and more realistically as The Lublin Gang, was taking shape. This committee of Stalin's stooges, including a leavening of renegade Poles, was put together in Moscow. As the Russian armies advanced, this committee set itself up in Lublin, on the eastern side of the Vistula. There followed the destruction of General Bor's Home Army by deception, as related above; and the later advance of the Russian armies into Warsaw and over the rest of Poland, as the Germans retreated. Concurrently with events Mikolajczyk's government in London was left more and more deserted and un-supported by the British government and our own.

On January 5, 1945, Stalin recognized the Lublin gang as the government of Poland and they established themselves in Warsaw. And then, in February, 1945, came the conference at Yalta.

At this conference Roosevelt and Churchill gave Stalin many countries which were not theirs to give, without even a word with or to the peoples of those countries who had fought as our allies in the war. Among them was Poland; almost half of it outright, as Russian territory, the remainder to be administered through a satellite government. They exacted the usual meaningless promises. The "Provisional Government" was to be broadened, to include other Polish leaders from Poland and abroad. And the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was to hold "free and unfettered" elections as soon as possible.

The commission set up to bring about the reorganization of the government included Molotov, and found itself completely stalled and stymied by him. Nobody could be taken into the government unless it met the approval and served the purposes of the Lublin gang. The gang remained, as it had begun, completely subservient to Stalin. Only Mikolajczyk and one or two lesser lights from the London group were taken into the government, in minor positions without power, as the best way ultimately to destroy them. Far from protesting, our government let Harry Hopkins assure Stalin that "we had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the present Polish Government in London involved in the new Provisional Government of Poland." And on July 5, 1945, the United States recognized this gang as the official government of Poland, appointed an ambassador to it, and withdrew all recognition of the Polish Government in London. And several hundred Polish soldiers in Italy committed mass suicide rather than be returned to their country which had been betrayed.

As to the "free and unfettered" elections, that is a story needing many hundred pages. Despite the lack of any slightest support, moral or otherwise, from the western nations, the Poles did not give up easily. It took one of the most brutal, extensive, and ferret-like police state operations of all history two years to subdue them to the point where the Russians dared hold those elections which had been promised "as soon as possible." And some details indicating the extent to which they were

"free and unfettered" still deserve a few brief paragraphs.

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Almost immediately after Yalta sixteen prominent Polish underground leaders were enticed out of hiding, for consultation with Soviet officials, by the "word of honor" of a Russian Colonel as to their safe conduct and by the advice of the British government that they accept this assurance. They were promptly arrested and taken to Moscow for "trial." Molotov calmly announced these arrests at the conference for the organization of the United Nations in San Francisco, apparently as a way of telling us, and the Poles, and the world, how little Stalin was worried about British and American interference in Poland. And it was after this that Hopkins made his trip referred to above and we officially recognized the satellite government!

This was typical, on a very small scale, of the police-state measures used. Our very able and conscientious ambassador, Arthur Bliss Lane, strove in every sensible way he could — with our own State Department, from which he later resigned to tell the true story, as well as with the Warsaw government — to get some semblance of compliance with the Yalta promises. How much chance he had can perhaps best be indicated by the fact that when he finally gave up, and left, his home-the American embassy!—had been occupied and overrun by ten different native "squatters" whom the Warsaw government refused to let him evict; and there were over one hundred American citizens in Polish jails, none of whom the American ambassador had even been allowed to visit.

During the very period when these things were going on our State Department—or more specifically, Dean Acheson and Donald Hiss — insisted over Ambassador Lane's vigorous protest on making the Warsaw government that loan of ninety million dollars which I mentioned in my longer letter. And during the very first of these two years under discussion UNRRA turned over to the Warsaw government, for distribution, as it saw fit, supplies worth four hundred and fifty million dollars, of which seventy-two percent was paid for by the United States. <sup>13</sup>

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During these same two years violence and deportations and legalized murder and every police-state method were used, in a rising crescendo of volume and severity, as the time finally set for the elections approached. Since ninety percent of the Polish people are Catholic, and hence bitterly hostile to Communism even by religious training, it was necessary to eliminate, browbeat, and terrorize vast percentages of this population before it could be coerced into the straitjacket of the Communist

tyranny. The farce of the "free and unfettered" elections was held on January 19, 1947, almost two years after Yalta. Every known form of intimidation, suppression, and deception had been used against members of the Peasant Party, the only opposition to the government. They included murders by the police, beatings, torture, arrests, dismissals from jobs, expulsion from farms, expulsion from living quarters, wrecking of party premises, police prevention of meetings, police attacks on meetings, prevention of the use of printing facilities, the arrest of seventy-five of the candidates themselves, distribution of slanderous booklets in country sections by the army, threats against the children of voters, and a pre-election campaign by the police to make peasants sign pledge cards for the government slate. At the election itself it was made clear that any voter who did not casually let his vote be seen by the election officials was endangering his life or his family.

Ambassador Lane reported all these things to Washington. Our State Department sent a note to Moscow that it was "especially perturbed" about them. Moscow made it clear that it was not perturbed about the American note. Ambassador Lane delivered notes of protest from our government to the Warsaw government itself, insisting that the solemn agreement of Yalta was being violated. The reply told Mr. Lane, in diplomatic jargon, to go peddle his papers and stop interfering with something that was none of his business. The elections were held, the government reported a practically unanimous victory, Ambassador Lane resigned, and the betrayal of Poland was finally complete.

#### III Nation after Nation

In China it was our ally Chiang Kaishek whom we badgered, hamstrung, and abandoned; and tools of Stalin named Mao and Chou En-lai and Chu Teh whom we helped to take over Chiang's country. In Poland it had been our ally Mikolajczyk whom we deceived, abandoned, and disowned; and tools of Stalin with such names as Osubka-Morawski and Boleslaw Bierut whom we had helped to take over Mikolajczyk's country. In Yugoslavia it had been our ally Mihailovich whom we shamefully disowned, libelled, and allowed to be "legally" murdered for the Communists' propaganda purposes;

and a tool of Stalin named Tito whom we helped to take over Mihailovich's country—for which Mihailovich had fought so hard and faithfully against our German enemies. In Albania and Bulgaria the characters of the drama were different but the plot remained the same. Essential parts of the plot, as applicable, were used on other stages around the world. We cannot possibly review these plays scene by scene. Instead, let's simply catalogue their un-

happy endings.

In August, 1945, Stalin's troops occupied Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands - thus pointing a permanent gun at Japan - by specific permission of the Yalta agreement. In October, 1945, Stalin's henchmen set up their "People's Republic" in Mongolia. In January, 1946, they proclaimed their "People's Republic" in Albania. In July, 1946, Stalin's mystery man, Tito, completed his crushing grasp of Yugoslavia by the public shooting of Mihailovich. In November, 1946, Stalin's agents took over Roumania and Bulgaria. In February, 1948, Stalin's lieutenants in Czechoslovakia pulled their coup d'état and formally placed that country behind the Iron Curtain. In May, 1948, Stalin's Asiatic servants set up their "People's Republic" in North Korea. In October, 1948, Stalin's troops took over Manchuria. By January, 1950, Stalin's viceroy, Mao, had completed his conquest of China. In October, 1950, Stalin's lackeys formalized their puppet state of East Germany. In May, 1951, Stalin's invaders seized Tibet. Whether Iran or Indo-China or Greece or Formosa is next we do not know. We know only that the policy of "containment of Communism," which has been the theoretical key to our course these recent years,

contains *nothing* except a cover-up for our ignominy and folly.

For in all of the sociological equations that Stalin has solved in order to make these various conquests, there has been one dependable factor. This has been the moral support and the financial support of our government, however, cleverly disguised and however skillfully the facts have been kept from the American people. David Martin points out that in 1942 Stalin was able to "sell" Tito to the United States largely because "the State Department and the Office of War Information contained personnel whose sympathy the Communists could count upon in advance." This situation has remained true and grown steadily worse in the decade since. Communists and their sympathizers, beguiling many innocents into mouthing their propaganda for them, are causing us right now to fight the most idiotic war in all history. In this war with Communist China, in which we have already suffered more than a hundred thousand casualties, our Seventh Fleet is today under orders to protect the coastline of our enemy Mao for him, from any possible attack by our friend and ally, Chiang Kai-shek. And six hundred thousand trained and patriotic Chinese soldiers on Formosa are refused their request to fight with us and for us, while our sons are being killed in battle and murdered as prisoners of war behind the lines. These and so many other facts show the truth, through all the cloud of sophistry put out by the State Department.

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The original "angels" for the promotion of Stalin's post-war imperialism were Roosevelt and Churchill. By 1946 Churchill had awakened, and publicly confessed, to the folly of the course he

had pursued. By 1948 he was proclaiming that "we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted." And the evidence is strong that in the closing weeks of his life even Roosevelt came to realize that he had been horribly duped. But by 1946 Roosevelt was dead and Churchill was out of power. The British socialists, partly through an ideological kinship with theoretical communism, and partly through an infiltration of actual Communists probably greater even than in our government, were easily led by the nose down whatever paths Stalin chose to take them. And President Truman, from the hour he took office, has been steadily sucked deeper into the quicksand of pro-Communist influence, until today he is virtually a captive of its pressures. How willing a captive he may be, because of his desire for the clever, insidious, and — in the past amazingly effective political support of the extreme Left Wing, is a question of interpretation more than of facts.

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But of the facts to prove his captivity there can be no doubt. His dismissal of MacArthur and the manner of that dismissal; his support of "Point Four" (a Communist scheme copied almost verbatim from a Communist blueprint, and already "sold" to many gullible American innocents); his unswerving attempts to block or hamstring every investigation into Communist infiltration of our government agencies; his acquiescence in the State Department's handling of the Korean war and in other monstrosities of State Department policy; his maintenance within his White House family, and appointment or attempted appointment to various government jobs, of persons with known pro-Communist sympathies; his humiliating ac-

ceptance of the fraudulent arrest of American citizens and the insulting treatment of our official representatives in all parts of the Communist world; his refusal to follow the urging of MacKenzie King and do something about the spy ring which was right then stealing our atomic secrets; his suppression of the Wedemeyer Report on China; his contradictory attitudes towards Franco and Tito; his readiness to debase our currency and to spend us into bankruptcy; these are all but details, of which there are hundreds more. The real facts merge into just one huge and simple fact, the actual and astounding progress, recorded above, which Communism has made since he became President in 1945 — and which progress is steadily gaining greater world-wide momentum.

That there are more Communists and Communist sympathizers in our government today than ever before seems to me almost a certainty. That some of them are men of great standing, in high places, and least suspected, is at least a frightening possibility. And I see no possible chance of weeding them out, or of learning one-half the truth, so long as Truman remains in power and his attitude of high-handed obstruction remains as their chief bulwark of defense. Even the great furore which has now been raised, over the colossal corruption in our government, has served the Communists well. It has taken the heat off the far more dangerous permeation of treason throughout that same government — and may even have been started and encouraged by Communists behind the scenes for that purpose.

Let me make it crystal clear that I do not think Harry Truman is a Communist or a sympathizer with Russian imperial ambitions. He is, I do think, a callous politician, with few scruples about the means used to achieve a political end. But I am sure that deep inside, and fundamentally, he is a loyal and patriotic American. I only wish that my pen had the inspired power to make Truman himself see, through the maze that has been pulled over his eyes, the imminence, the immensity, and the horror of the Communist threat in its stark reality.

It is far too much to expect. For the real trouble is a callousness throughout the whole mood and the collective conscience of the American people. How can we expect either Roosevelt or Truman to have been disturbed by the barbarous Katyn Massacre, or to have reduced for that reason their pampering appeasement and generosity to its perpetrators? The news of a similar mass murder, of eight thousand of our own sons and brothers, as prisoners of war behind the Korean lines, caused only a temporary ripple of indignation across the national consciousness; and we go serenely on negotiating with, and making new concessions to, the cold-blooded murderers.

What's the matter with us, anyway? Neither facts nor pictures seem to sink into our centers of feeling any more. They remain just words and lines and forms, objective phenomena outside the glazed surface of our noumenal existence. The physical suffering, the mental anguish, the never-ceasing terror of our fellow human beings, represented by these words and pictures, no longer reach through the glaze to activate our imaginations or to excite our sympathies.

The lowest estimate any recognized authority is willing to make places the

number of slave laborers in Russia at eight million persons. It may be twice that great. Most of these people have been brutally torn from their homes and their families somewhere, for the very reason that they loved their homes and families; that they were not the kind of people who could be expected to sacrifice civilized lovalties to the service of a Communist tyranny. Very few have ever escaped from these camps, and reached an opportunity to tell the West about them. But some have, and enough for the purpose. There are available carefully restrained, documented, and incontrovertible expositions of the conditions of brutality, filth, disease, terror, and hopelessness under which these victims - men like you and me - work out the days or years until they are no longer worth famine-rations to their captors. This knowledge has been available throughout all the years that our government has been helping to hand ever more peoples and provinces to "good old Uncle Joe." It is available to all those Communists and their sympathizers in our midst who befoul our schools, our public forums, and even our courts. with their rantings about idealism and freedom. We read about these things in the newspapers for a cursory minute, and then turn with a shrug to the sports pages or the comics.

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America was long looked to as the light of the world; a land and a people of happiness and strength; a nation that had for itself, and promoted for others wherever its influence reached, justice and honor and decency and freedom. The remembrance of that light dies slowly, even when it can no longer be seen. Today in Poland, in China, in Czechoslovakia, in numberless areas be-

hind the Iron Curtain, there are millions of families - like yours and mine which have been decimated, starved, and frightened into abject submission; but which still cling to the dream that presently, maybe even next week or next year, the United States is going to come, in all its beneficent majesty, to rescue them from the inhuman tyranny which owns them now. In their moments of greatest misery or despair they ask the question: "When will the Americans come?" The Americans, unfortunately, all of us, are busy playing our little games; while our government, far from worrying about how the Iron Curtain might ever be lifted, is frequently lending a hand — as to Mao in China -to those who are trying to bring down another section of the curtain to swallow up another piece of the globe.

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There are good diplomats and bad diplomats, of course. But above all there are too many diplomats, and they have too much power. They sit around their conference tables omnipotently giving away the lives and homes and souls of millions of people who are helpless in the shuffle. Fourteen million Germans were ruthlessly uprooted, and scattered as refugees over the face of central Europe. Two million of them died, of disease or starvation. The remaining twelve million are still refugees, adding their own destitution to a precarious German economy, and creating ever new problems for the diplomats to confer about importantly at their stuffedshirt meetings. And was this atrocity committed in order to punish these Germans for having supported Hitler? Not at all, for the people of East Poland fought Hitler as long and as hard as anybody else in Europe, and they were treated just as horribly, in the same

package deal. This piece of barbarism on the epic scare was arranged simply to please Stalin. It fitted into his plans. Who protested? Or who really cared, in America or anywhere else - except among the victims? Fourteen million people, two million of them dead-just so many words, or sounds! The suffering of fourteen million individual human beings just didn't register, unless you or I were one of the fourteen mil-

As we sit in our warm homes, after a happy meal with our families, and turn on our television sets or radios, it is hard for us to think of a man just like ourselves always half-starved, always half-frozen, haggard and hopeless, remembering the days when he too was free, as he is brutally driven to finish up the literal exhaustion of his body in labor for the benefit of the very tyrant who has enslaved him. It is harder still to remember that there are millions of such men; or that in the past six years six hundred million of our fellow human beings have been placed under the merciless heel of this monster and the bestial control of his henchmen and police.

For the pusillanimous part that we have played in all this spreading horror; for our indifference to the grief of others; for our apathy to the crimes we saw and our blindness to those we should have seen; for our gullibility in the acceptance of veneered treason and our easy forgetfulness even when the veneer had been rubbed off; for all our witting and unwitting help to the vicious savages of the Kremlin and to their subordinate savages everywhere, may God-and our fellow men-some

day forgive us!

#### IV How SAFE ARE WE?

We can never earn the forgiveness of these people we have betrayed, however, by inspiration, help, or leadership to throw off their chains of tyranny, if we ourselves are first shackled by the same tyrant. And no man, outside of the innermost councils of the Kremlin, can judge the closeness or the extent of our danger. I can only put down, for our readers to evaluate as they wish, those facts, conjectures, and opinions which worry me most as portents of the

coming storm.

1. To my mind Korea remains what it has been from the very beginning - primarily a practice field on which Stalin holds his rehearsal for the war to come. Even the blindest partisan of Acheson and Marshall must admit that Stalin has been able, by the levers of diplomacy, to adjust both the expanse and nature of the Korean conflict at will. Today, with ground action held to a minimum by going through the endless motions of fraudulent truce talks, Stalin is using the practice field for his jets. Drew Pearson, in his column of February 15, said: "The blunt fact is that the Kremlin is using Korea as a graduate school to train Russian pilots how to fly against American planes." It is now almost a year since prophesied this development in speeches from notes which were later converted into the body of this pamphlet. And I pointed out that as to ground fighting the rehearsal was already far advanced. Since that time I have seen only confirmation of my worry that, as the Spanish Civil War was provoked by Stalin to be a training ground for World War II, the Korean Civil War has been deliberately

planned to serve the same purpose for World War III.

2. Despite all the "important" meetings and publicized diplomatic victories and ballyhoo and clamor, I am very much afraid we are getting absolutely no place in Europe. England couldn't help us if it wanted to, because over the past twenty years appeasement has become a too deeply ingrained principle of British foreign policy for any government to stand up against that policy until the very day of attack. France has nothing to help with, except troubles to add to the confusion. Germany has no will to become the battleground on which the armies of the East and West would meet. In Italy there are undoubtedly more Communists today than there are in Russian-controlled Poland. In Belgium we sided with the Communists in depriving the people of their beloved king — despite his impressive victory at the polls, which we flouted —and we now ask those same people to accept privations to help us fight the Communists. In Europe the governments think we are suckers, the people think we are meddlesome fools. For years our State Department has been giving ample reasons for both opinions. All we are actually accomplishing in Europe is the waste of a tremendous amount of American money, one more excuse for the strangling regimentation of our economy, and a false confidence in the American people of an approach towards greater security. Stalin could not have planned the whole thing better himself — as maybe he did.

3. We are following so exactly, and now at so obviously an accelerated pace, the precise course, of spending ourselves towards bankruptcy, of indecision and confusion, of weak-kneed ineffectiveness and humiliating appeasement, which has been laid out for us in the Communist prospectus. And the same clique which has brought us to this pass, still in control, still has no clear aim to offer, of war or of peace or of negotiation, to our enemy or to ourselves. All is confusion; and it becomes daily more inconceivable that it is not brilliantly arranged confusion, rapidly reaching a climax.

4. We are swallowing the Tito bait, hook, line, and sinker. Which means that we are pouring huge quantities of war matériel and of our newest armament into the hands of the Commu-

nists to be used against us.

I am aware that few of our readers will believe me, for the deception has been too cleverly planned and too realistically executed. I have no proof; how could I? But I have the right to state my opinion, so long as it is clearly labeled opinion, nevertheless. What's more, I have a solemn duty to state that opinion, under the circumstances, and to set forth the evidence that supports it.

I should have liked to have given the story of the betrayal of Mihailovich, as a background for these paragraphs. There wasn't room or time, for no brief summary could have given the essence of that story as in the case of Poland. Because Tito is a far cleverer man than Osubka-Morawski, or even Molotov, it takes a huge and cumulative mass of details to construct the truth of the Yugoslavian horror.

Suffice it to say here that when Josef Broz Tito was sprung on the world, in July, 1942, by a new clandestine radio station calling itself "Radio Free Yugoslavia," nobody knew who he was or where he came from, nor even if Tito

was his right name. They still do not, to this day. It has been claimed that he was a Croatian, but there was no documentation and no convincing evidence. All that did become clear was that he was an agent of Stalin, obviously well trained in Russia, who had been sent into Yugoslavia to take victory out of the hands of our allies who were doing the fighting, as Mao did in China and the Lublin gang in Poland. By promoting civil strife while the energies of real patriots were needed to fight the German conquerors, by lies about Mihailovich more foul and more ably spread abroad than those of Mao about Chiang, by a rising terrorism as ruthless as that of Mao, by the full support of arms and advisors and money from Russia, by the falsification of allied military intelligence, by the growing support of America and Britain obtained through Russian pressures and Stalin's sympathizers within those countries, and by resort to every Communist technique from treason to mass murder, he succeeded. In July, 1946, he became the undisputed and all-powerful dictator of Yugoslavia. He remains so to this day.

The myth that Mao was an "agrarian reformer," or that even if a communist he was an independent and nationalistic communist who might be persuaded to break with Stalin, was the most carefully built up lie of all the pro-Chinese Communist propaganda. The best-known biography of Mao, written by a little English pink now residing in this country, followed this Communist line so closely as to omit all mention of Mao's ever having been in Moscow, although it purported to give full and voluminous details about his whole life. The plain well-established facts are that Mao was not only trained in Moscow,

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but was considered such a brilliant pupil as to have been used to teach other Communists — in Moscow — his methods. But the myth was persistently and persuasively enough presented for it serve as a partial justification of our

support of Mao for years.

To anybody who looked at the fundamentals of the situation, and ignored the smokescreen tossed up around them, that myth was ridiculous. But it served its purpose — a temporary one - very well. To anybody who looks at the fundamentals, and ignores the red herrings that have been so cleverly dragged across the trail, the myth that Tito has ever really broken with Stalin is just as ridiculous. But this lie was intended to serve a much deeper and longer-range purpose. It had to be much more realistically and convincingly staged. The stakes were enormous. And you could almost hear Stalin saying to Tito, as one wrestler would say to a "fixed" opponent, "now remember, you've got to make it good." They made it good. And the fiction of Tito's rebellion has served some wonderful propaganda purposes for the Communists, as simply a dividend on their investment for the real capital returns. Could you imagine an any more beautiful set-up, or one more in keeping with the deep cunning of Stalin's nature?

"But look at all the terrible things Stalin and Tito have said about each other, and all the bitterness they have inculcated in their respective subjects towards each other," somebody says. "How could they undo this cleavage even if they wanted to?" To which I reply "Horseradish!" This name-calling and this propaganda has been peanuts compared to that used by Stalin and

Hitler towards each other for years; and their respective subjects were even given a deep-rooted ideological base for their mutual bitterness. But when the time came Stalin and Hitler could pull those subjects together as friends and collaborators, or set them at each other's throats as mortal enemies, at the turn of a phrase and the drop of a whispered command. The same procedure is infinitely easier as between Tito and Stalin.

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It is a well recognized principle of Communist technique that "where there is sufficient strength, there can be a show of weakness." But where there is a real weakness there must always be a show of strength, and the weakness must never be exposed. Does anybody think that if Stalin did not really own Tito, and that if this fact were not known to the really top Communists, this festering sore of rebellion and this flaunting of organizational weakness — in the tightest hierarchy of power the world has ever seen - would be allowed to exist for years? That Stalin, who could have his closest working companions liquidated in the "purge' trials, for the sake of eliminating any question of his own absolute power; or who could reach all the way into Mexico, through the careful defenses of a trained and suspicious revolutionary, to have Trotsky assassinated, to show that not even a doctrinal schism could be tolerated; that this man would have been unwilling or unable to wipe out Tito in a week if Tito threatened in the slightest his completely autocratic and imperial command? Not one place in the world can you find where Stalin has lost the slightest degree of prestige or of authority with his Communist subordinates, due to Tito's alleged revolt - because they all know better.

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There are other glaring giveaways to this gigantic fraud, for anybody who cares to look with both eyes open. One is the persistency with which we are told, frequently as though the information had been obtained by some vigilant intelligence service of our government, and usually by people known in the past as Communist sympathizers but now supposedly reformed, that Stalin is about to attack Yugoslavia. There really were plenty of reliable intelligence reports that the North Korean Communists were about to cross the 38th Parallel in force, but these were kept from the American people and even from MacArthur. We never heard any rumors of Stalin's intentions with regard to Tibet until the country had already been seized. But we drink our coffee every other morning to the accompaninent of planted newspaper predictions that Stalin is about to go after Tito at last and we had better send more supplies to this first line of our defense. Just how gullible can we become?

And the last revealing reaction I shall mention, before resting my case, is the one that causes me to number this acceptance of Tito among the darkest clouds on the horizon. For our government is loaded with people who, to put it diplomatically, had a recognizable "soft" attitude towards Stalin for a long time. Many of them have now been forced, by a rising doubt and anger in the American people, or have found it expedient, to take a public position of "realistic hardness." They go loudly for an almost fantastic preparedness and rearmament program, with a great deal more emphasis on how many billions we spend than on what we get for our money. They are all for arming and

"coordinating" our allies, whether we have adequate equipment for our own forces or not. And the "ally," the bulwark against Stalinism, the man we must arm and help with money and materials above all other, is Tito. Franco, who has actually fought for his life and the life of his nation against Stalin's murderous agents, we mustn't help or depend on, because he is not democratic! The newspapers report Truman and Eisenhower as making gratuitously insulting remarks about Franco, right at the very time our government is supposedly exerting its best efforts to arrange for our establishment of air bases in Spain. But Tito, well we mustn't look a gift horse in the mouth, or be squeamish about allies when we need them so badly. Pour in the guns and the butter, too, in mammoth quantities and with never-resting speed, before Stalin attacks. And pouring them in we are; in such staggering amounts that the State Department would not dare tell the truth to the American people, and any figures they did publish could no more be believed than the calculated reverse lies they told about our aid to Chiang Kai-shek or to the Republic of South Korea. (If you think this language is harsh, instead of merely factual, look up the records and study the Congressional hearings for yourself.)

5. We are so rapidly losing prestige everywhere in the world, the diplomatic tide is turning so strongly against us, the number of votes against us at times and of *voters* against us at all times in the U.N. deliberations is so alarmingly increasing, that even our pretense of anti-Communist leadership is about to be lost for the lack of a following. And unless a miracle can be worked, in awakening the American people to an

angry and determined stand, Communist China will presently be seated in the United Nations with the blessings of our "allies" England and France. We are giving our strength more and more to others as we approach closer and

closer to being left alone.

6. Our own government is literally falling apart at the seams. There not only is neither truth, nor honesty, nor honor to be found in its decrees or in its actions; they are no longer even expected, and their absence is brazenly taken for granted. There is no charted course to which our people subscribe, no goals towards which we might confidently aim, no leadership that either leads or has any sense of direction. As a whole, or in its separate departments and bureaus, our government is at an all time low; in efficiency, in economy, in integrity, in clarity of purpose, in the calibre and character of its top personnel, and in the respect and regard accorded it by the American people. And the very processes of our constitutional procedure make it inevitable that this deterioration, disintegration, and discord will become far worse, and weaken our dissipated national effectiveness far more, between now and next January.

That corruption permeates every pore of the monstrosity of organization and disorganization to which our bureaucracy has expanded is known and tolerated. That every gesture of the administration towards investigation of either corruption or treason will be a whitewash is accepted with cynical acquiescence by a legislative majority which cannot itself show all clean hands. We have men appointed to ambassadorships or important departmental posts whose chief qualifications are that they need to get out of the country, or that nobody can prove they are actual Communists. And the government is falling apart, not because of external pressures of an aroused citizenry, but because the very foulness inside is too great to permit connecting sinews

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of strength and of command.

The administration flouts both our constitution and the best known laws on our legislative books. Its arbitrary choosing of the congressional enactments which it wishes to ignore and of those which it cares to enforce has already brought us from a government of laws to a government of corrupt little men. During the next several months these corrupt little men will quarrel still more among themselves; and even our soundest citizens outside the government will be split by bitterness within our political divisions and subdivisions. To what extent these enormous elements of at least temporary weakness have been contrived and fomented by the Communists there is no way of knowing. But that the Kremlin is far better informed as to our situation than are the majority of our own citizens you can be sure. And that a badly leaking ship, with a crooked and inefficient crew and a broken rudder, is an invitation to ruthless and well-armed brigands watching their opportunity-that is a known fact which makes our present circumstances the most alarming in our history.

7. The last worry about the outlook, which I shall mention here, is the growing quiet before the storm. It seemed to me a year ago that I could sense a tendency, on the part of the Kremlin, to a greater appearance of reasonableness; that tensions were being maneuvered into a soothing semblance of static equilibrium; that we were going to

be led into feeling that our rearmament program, our going through motions in Europe, our delicately balanced stalemate in Korea, our grimaces about lines that must not be crossed, were causing hesitation in Moscow and warranted optimism in Washington. We would begin to hear a great deal of inside revelations about Russia's lack of oil, and disagreements within the politburo, and disaffection among the satellite nations, and possible breaks between Mao and Stalin, and "rust holes in the Iron Curtain." The impression would be nurtured that time was on our side; that having at last made proper plans we could just watch while those plans gradually advanced us to an unassailable position; that we could relax in the meantime, and start jousting with ourselves over some such issue as corruption in our government. It seems to me to-Lay that the feeling of a year ago has

There are other reasons for worry, especially connected with a time schedule which, I am terribly afraid, can be projected like a curve from an adequate number of known points. But I have been far too much of an alarmist al-

been borne out by events. Again I hope

that my interpretation is as wrong as

ready.

my fears are great.

## THE TIME IS NOW

It was Thursday night, Mr. Regnery, when you called me on the telephone. It was Friday night before I had a chance to start on this "postscript" which I am going to deliver to you in New York next Thursday. Because of the time pressure I have written it, in the purple-passage language of a less cynical age, "at white heat." I do not

even know whether you will be willing to publish this new material, or whether we can squeeze it within the pages planned and the costs required by your quotation to distributors of the pamphlet. But I had to write it—now.

In this letter, as in the earlier one, I make no pretense to either originality or scholarship. You have already recognized, I am sure, that my story of the Communist treatment of Poland is primarily a condensation of just one chapter in William Henry Chamberlin's great book, America's Second Crusade. My background knowledge for the condensation came from Arthur Bliss Lane's I Saw Poland Betrayed. All the rest of the letter, except where clearly shown to be a transcript of my own thoughts, is merely history lifted piecemeal from newspaper and magazine reports or from the pages of honest historians. I have had no contact with socalled "original sources."

My purpose in writing this letter I hope is plain. I want to alert as many of my fellow-Americans as the pamphlet or book can reach to the dangerous difference between appearances and reality, in our fight against Communism and in the progress of that fight. I have given the best I had to this effort, however inadequate it may be. This statement is made in frankness and humility, for a sound reason. I want to ask the reader who has had the patience to come with me this far to do me a favor in return.

You—such reader—may not be convinced. The best that I had may not have been good enough. But you are a patriotic American who would like to know, and would be willing to face, the truth. At the end of this letter there is

a list of books. 18 In each case the name

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of the author, the title of the book, and the publisher is given. Many of them are books which the Communists have tried very hard, and in most cases successfully, to keep out of your hands. For this purpose the Communists have infiltrated and dominated the book-review pages of many of our great periodicals; they have planted clerks in many book stores to hide "hostile" books under the counters or to steer purchasers away from such books; they have influenced library purchasing and have intimidated publishers. These are provable and proven facts. As a result many of these books-in fact most of them — are out of print and may be hard to obtain, even just to read and not to own. It took me four months of diligent effort to find a copy of Arthur Bliss Lane's I Saw Poland Betrayed that I could even borrow; it took the best secondhand book dealers in Boston five months to find one that I could buy.

But to know the truth, especially important truth that has been deliberately hidden from you, is worth some labor. Get hold of these books, especially the ones that I have starred. Read them for yourself, with an open and unbiased mind. Take nothing for granted, from me or from anybody else. Judge the dependability of the books, the veracity of their authors, the importance of their message, entirely on your own. When you finish far less than half of the list you will be satisfied, I believe with all my head and heart, that the truth is far more shocking and the danger far more horrible than I have been able to paint them here.

When you know the truth, then what? What is to be done? That question is being asked, at least silently, by literally millions of people who have

never heard of me or my small efforts. For those who care about my answers, I have two. They are honest and direct.

The first is, weigh and appraise all news items against this larger background of truth. For the game goes on, without recess or change. A few years ago there was a conference at San Francisco to set up the United Nations. It was proclaimed as a great step forward -for us, for everybody. We know now that the conference was brilliantly stage-managed and disastrously "loaded" against the best interests of our country — by Alger Hiss and his allies. A few months ago there was another conference at San Francisco, to sign formally our peace treaty with Japan. It was proclaimed as a great step forward -for us, and for the free world. The actual treaty written by Dulles may have been a conscientious and superb, piece of work. But in my opinion it will take far less than five years, if we are all around that long, to show that the appearances of this conference were just as deceptive, the stage-management just as phony, and the set-up just as "loaded" against America's best interests — by a man who refuses to turn his back on Alger Hiss, and his allies. Certainly there are few things the Kremlin wanted more than for us to put Japan on its own, so that they could go to work on that country without our on-the-spot supervision. And it is already known that the Soviet did not even have any intention of opposing the treaty until the last minute, when it seemed wise to do so for their usual purposes of deception.

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A few years ago we set out to win friends and rehabilitate nations through UNRRA. We know now that the UNRRA supplies for Poland were

channeled through the Communist Menshikov, and used to strengthen and win friends for the Communist government: that the UNRRA supplies for China were largely channeled through Madame Sun Yat-sen, and used to strengthen and win friends for Mao's Communists; and that the same pattern was widely followed elsewhere. Then came the "Marshall Plan," originally designed to apply equally to the Soviet "republics" and their satellites, as to other nations. It is a little early to prove that the chief result of the Marshall Plan, even as used, was to strengthen the hand of socialist governments, permeated through and through by Communist sympathizers, who were playing footsie-wootsie with the Soviets far more cozily than was ever dreamed of, by most of their citizensor ours. But the facts are all there. Just where are all those staunch friends the Marshall Plan was supposed to have won for us, in our fight against the Communists? Even England, which has claimed to be by far the most appreciative of its beneficiaries, is consistently on the side of Mao and the Chinese Communists, against ourselves. And if Churchill really tries to reverse this tacit working arrangement, he knows that he will be thrown out of power.

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Now it is the NATO. General Eisenhower may be doing his utmost to have it make sense, and serve our needs. But I, for one, have persistent fears that five years from now — again if we are all around that long — it may prove to have been just as phony, and just as futile or worse, as were UNRRA and the Marshall Plan. There is a difference, however. With UNRRA we were spending hundreds of millions of dollars. With the Marshall Plan we were

spending billions. With NATO we are spending tens of billions. It has just recently been announced that we should raise our sights, as to the costs of a greatly expanded NATO program, to three times their present level. We shall be talking about hundred of billions to "contain" Communism in Europe before long. [The goal set at Lisbon for NATO, as announced since this was written, was an army to cost three hundred billion dollars!] 17

The lesser grist of news in the day's mill is all of the same crop. Dean Acheson has just reversed the finding of his own State Department loyalty board, in order to "clear" O. Edmund Clubbreferred to on Page 34 above - by personal decree. (It is hard to believe that Mr. Acheson had read the eighty-seven pages of testimony recorded from Clubb's appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee.) Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., whose "suspension" we also recorded on Page 34, is now right-hand advisor to Commissioner McCloy in Germany, helping to determine our policies with regard to the German government and the German' people. Russia has just stolen our "fabulously effective" secret mine, reported to be completely undetectable by ships which it endangers; the newspapers give the matter headlines for one day, and nobody pays any more attention. The repeated testimony of many witnesses before the McCarran Committee has now identified forty-seven persons connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations as having been Communists or Soviet agents. Letters and memoranda from the files of the IPR, found hidden in Edward C. Carter's barn in Lee, Massachusetts, show that the IPR was busily disseminating Communist propaganda during its period of activity discussed in the pages above. (But you will have to wait a long time before you find those details in some of

our newspapers.)

"Dr." Owen Lattimore, now before the Committee, is daily admitting "errors" in his previous testimony under oath. Kiplinger writes that the truce talks in Korea are about to end but with the appearance of surprise — that we are not going to "give" Formosa to the Reds as one of our concessions after all! Newspaper reports make clear that the Chinese Communists have used the "truce" period, exactly as they used those forced on Chiang Kai-shek by General Marshall, to build up their forces, so that they now have overwhelming superiority of numbers in the air as well as on the ground. The amount of waste, increasingly revealed, that we are buying instead of armament with our defense billions makes us shudder over the extent to which this waste may be deliberate and intentional. And I have just heard a Pulitzer Prizewinning former editor, a great "liberal," tell our local Chamber of Commerce that the logic of events in Asia is with Mao and his Communists so that he will become the ally of ourselves instead of Stalin! Truly, the more it all changes the more it is just the same thing; and the more I bring this letter up to date, the more I am just repeating what I have already written. I wish simply to underscore my first answer: Read the news with a penetrating glance for the broad sweep of terrifying truth between the lines.

My second answer is plainer yet. Make your voice heard and your vote felt. Write letters, make telephone calls, personally speak your sentiments — to newspaper and magazine editors, to senators and congressmen and local representatives, to teachers and preachers and just plain friends. Use judgment in order to be fair, restraint in order to be effective, but persistence in order to be heard. And don't let up. The

Communists never let up.19

Make your voice heard and your vote felt. Our enemies are neither Democrats nor Republicans. Our enemies are the Communists. Our opponents are their allies, their dupes, and those who support them for whatever cause. This is a fundamental fight which must not be stymied by partisanship. Martin Dies, to whose pioneering efforts at uncovering Communist traitors in our midst this country may owe its very existence. was a Democrat. Senator McCarran, who is continuing the same undertake ing so doggedly today, is a Democrat. Senator Nixon and Congressman Judd are Republicans. The whole effort rises and must rise above the level of ordinary political considerations. But it is high time for us to start guiding our feet by the lamp of long experience. It is time for us to put in charge of our government men - and only those men whom we know everything about; concerning whom there can be no possible question as to their intellectual honesty, their abilities, their own patriotism, or the patriotism of those with whom they have been closely associated. It is high time that, by impeachment or by elections, we stop "trusting the future to those who have betrayed the past."

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Sincerely,

ROBERT H. W. WELCH, JR.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Browder hung on, as Communist liaison agent in the International Settlement at Shanghai, for several months yet. He then went first to Moscow, from which he was sent back to America in 1929 to take over the American Communist Party.

<sup>2</sup> Stalin had actually won his point, that in non-industrialized countries such as China the orthodox approach to Communism, through agitation among the urban proletariat, was to be superseded by the opportunism of "agrarian reform" among the peasants, by August, 1928. And Mao was, of course, one of the leaders of the fighting remnants of Communists which had fled first to Hunan Province after the debacle at Hankow, and which in 1928 was holding on in the mountains of Kiangsi. But it was not till 1929 (when Trotsky was finally banished from Russia) that Stalin's completely autocratic power in international communism became undeniable, or that the entirely new pattern for the Communist conquest of China began to emerge out of the wreckage of the old one.

<sup>a</sup> It is actually less than a thousand miles from the mountains of Kiangsi to the city of Yenan. Because these Communist holdouts were constantly on the run before Chiang's troops and beuse they had to live on the land as marauding brigands, the main body of these forces traveled between five and six thousand circuitous miles in order to make this passage. And the Communists have done their utmost to give the migration of this murdering rabble an epic flavor by eulogizing it as the "Long March." There has even been one attempt to appeal to the heartstrings of the world by a book glorifying the "Children of the Long March."

<sup>4</sup> This treaty, originally signed on April 13, 1941, had stated as one of its three main points that it was to be valid for five years. Naturally, Soviet and Japanese diplomats did not get together, after Pearl Harbor, with a coterie of reporters and photographers, to announce solemnly to the world that the pact still held. But they did make it clear to each other, by notes and by actions, that both governments considered the treaty not to have been affected by America's entry into the war as the enemy of one and the ally of the other. And Russia's withdrawal of some of her forces from the Manchurian border, on the basis of this agreement, made it easier for Japan to score victories against ourselves during 1942.

<sup>5</sup> When the question is one of census, either military or civilian, in China, there is always room for dispute. It is definitely known, however, that by the middle of 1945, Mao had at least five hundred thousand men in organized military ranks, and that the number mushroomed very rapidly during the remainder of the year. The figure I have given for the end of 1945 is an estimate based on the consensus of information available. Rifles and training for these troops was a different matter. The rifles and ammunition were to come from the Japanese stockpile in Manchuria. Time required for the arming, training, and grouping of these troops was to be supplied by the consecutive truces forced on Chiang Kaishek by General George C. Marshall.

<sup>9</sup> The same considerations as to problems of census apply here as in Note 5. One authority, for whose opinion I have very high respect, says that the number of inhabitants in that part of Shensi Province controlled by Mao in 1937 could have been as high as 1,500,000. This would of course, have represented roughly 1/3 of 1% instead of 1/8 of 1%, of the population of China. The only absolutely positive conclusion for the reader, therefore, is that the figure lies somewhere between these limits. But the numbers I have given represent my own best summation of the evidence.

7 See Note 9.

<sup>8</sup> Since this was written, she has refused to tell the McCarran Committee whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party, on the grounds of self-incrimination.

"As is made clear in the parenthetical comment following this statement, about one-half of this number were administrators, technicians, traders — and their families — and all the other adjuncts to a huge occupation of enemy territory for imperialistic purposes. That they were all a part of the force of that occupation is made clear by the fact that the whole three million were repatriated when Japan lost the war.

<sup>10</sup> On the first printing of May God Forgive Us, this statement was picked up as being erroneous, on the grounds that "September, 1945" should have read "November, 1945." The critic was himself confused by the fact that General Hurley did resign in November. But there is in my possession copy of a letter sent me by General Hurley in which he himself has stated, correctly: "I left China on September 22, 1945, and have never returned."

<sup>11</sup> The Communists boasted loudly, "Well, we got Grew"; and took to themselves noisy credit for the conquest. It has also been widely argued that Acheson, although out of the State Department at the time, had a strong hand in the actual ouster of Grew. But Grew himself feels otherwise, and I have written this paragraph in accordance with the interpretation of events which he himself has given me. The point at issue makes no difference in the real developments, which were the substitution for Grew's attitude of skepticism, about Communist activities and intentions, of the

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Acheson policy of pro-Soviet "understanding" and collaboration.

This refusal of recognition of Poland's 1939 boundaries was accomplished, with typical Communist indirection, not by what was said but by what was omitted. In this pact the Soviet Government "recognized that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 dealing with territorial changes in Poland had lost their validity." But there was no Soviet acceptance of the previous boundaries which the Stalin-Hitler partnership had wiped out. And this was not because the point was overlooked, for Sikorski did everything he could to get such actual recognition of Poland's territorial integrity, and it was because of this omission that several members of his cabinet resigned.

<sup>18</sup> The remaining twenty-eight percent was paid by countries to which we were making "loans," almost entirely out of those loans.

<sup>16</sup> For a reprinting of this book, more than three years after this paragraph was written, it would be easiest simply to put a note here saying that obviously the evidence was not valid and my fears were unfounded. But that would be too easy, for I don't think it would be true.

The long-range patience of the Communist leaders and the planned gradualism of the Communist advance are both undeniable. But Stalin was willing to destroy any friend, distort or discard any Communist doctrine, alter or reverse any Communist strategy, for the sake of increasing his own personal power. I believe that his obsession with the desire to rule the world might easily have caused him to have taken the gamble of atomic attack and all-out war on the United States, if he had still had sufficient energy, health and life expectancy left by the time he himself thought the gamble offered some chance of success. think there is considerable evidence that the fall of 1952 had been tentatively set as a time for such an attack, and that we may well have been saved from the beginning of the "hottest" war the planet has so far known, at that time, by Stalin's realistic appraisal of his own health. This is basically a conjecture, of course, but I am not willing to admit that the conjecture has, or had, no palpable foundations.

#### Additional Notes For The January, 1960 Edition

<sup>15</sup> Whether this would have been true if Stalin had lived there is no way of knowing. But the Communist conspiratorial apparatus in Iran, which was exposed and exploded in the fall of 1954, was the most powerful, in relation to the size of the nation involved, that has ever been fully revealed before it was successful in taking over a country. So de Courcy, who is of course the "private intelligence agency" referred to, could have been entirely right if Stalin's death had not caused the reins to get tangled.

Also, it is possible that de Courcy was correct, and even reasonably accurate, that Stalin had been stockpiling four atom bombs per month. But not bombs of Soviet manufacture. Since that time the evidence has become pretty strong that in 1952 the Soviets had not yet actually made, themselves, a single A-bomb. Their agents had simply walked off, from our atomic energy plants, with the parts needed, which had then been assembled in Russia into the bombs exploded for prestige purposes—or stockpiled for the future.

18 (Add mentally to Note 14 above.) Also, we know now that, if Taft had been nominated in 1952, the Soviets might have had reason to take the desperate gamble of military attack, before the weeding out of their agents and destruction of their power in this country could have begun under Taft as President. While by October, 1952, they had been relieved of this fear of Taft. And if they felt that they did not have nearly any such drastic opposition or dangerous setback to fear under Eisenhower, their appraisal of the situation has been amply justified by subsequent events.

Any thought that the Communists are not immensely more powerful within our country and within our government today, than they were in 1952, is itself due to a blind complacency of the American people induced by that rising Communist influence.

But today, and for the immediately foreseeable future, I do not think any insults, threats, or opposition could provoke the Soviets into a full-scale hot war — despite all the advantages they would have from surprise attacks, and from methods and ruthlessness which civilized human beings could not use. For the present Communist rulers, unlike Stalin, are not only "mad, north-northwest." They fear the simultaneous uprising of so many hundreds of millions of enslaved people, at the automatic signal of an all-out war. And they are winning the rest of the planet too easily without it.

out it.

17 And this is just about what NATO has now cost us. The equivalent of our total admitted national debt. What do we have for it? Exactly what was originally planned—nothing.

<sup>18</sup> As explained in the letter on the inside front cover, the reading list has been omitted in this edition because there are now so many better ones available.

<sup>19</sup> If you are seriously interested in the more specific answers that can now be given you, as to what you as an individual can do about our danger—which has become so tremendously greater and more imminent since 1952—write The John Birch Society, Belmont 78, Massachusetts. Doing so will entail no obligation on you of any kind.

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(Before publication in 1952)

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"This excellent summary of subversive activities in our Government should be read by every American in this crucial election year. To me, the important lesson to be drawn from Mr. Welch's article is how the conception of government has changed, for the worse, in the past twenty years under the New and Fair Deals. This concept has, within the past few weeks, been illustrated by President Truman's seizure of the steel industry and his remark, whether flippant or not, that the President has the authority also to take over the press and the radio industry."

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Former Ambassador to Poland

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Louis E. Denfeld Former Chief of Staff, United States Navy

